usage regarded by them as a means of obtaining the divine mind.   They determined by lot who should be the twelfth apostle, and thus they made a selection to which a cheerful acquiescence was unanimously given.

I have assumed a case of two electors, and pointed out the course which might be followed—indeed, the only rational course which could be followed. If the principle laid down be sound, could it not be applied in other cases? Let us assume that the electorate consists of twenty voters, what could be done in this case? If individual voters in the electorate were equal in all respects, as in the first case referred to, the question would be a very simple one, as it might be settled by casting lots for one of the twenty equally eligible persons. It may be taken for granted that under the circumstances no one would object to make the selection in this way, as being the simplest and best mode of making a choice. It would remove antagonism and promote unanimity; and, by the very act of casting lots, each one of the twenty taking part therein would be an assenting party to the choice made.   Men as we ordinarily find them are, however, not alike; they differ much in their qualifications, and their opinions are not the same; we must therefore consider cases in which equal eligibility and uniformity of mind in the whole electorate is not the rule.

First, let us suppose that among the twenty electors, five voters favor the choice of *A*, another five *B*, another *C*, and the remainder *D*. We should thus have *A, B, C, D*, each equally desired and preferred as the representative of the twenty.

$(A+B+C+D) : 4$ would therefore be the representative unit of the whole. We cannot, however, take one quarter of *A, B, C,* and *D*, and combine these quarters so as to form one individual, but we can reduce the four to one by the principle of casting lots. One of the four can be selected by what may be termed the "Apostolic" method, and the person so selected would be recognized as chosen by the twenty electors as the common representative of the whole.

Secondly, let us suppose a case in which there is less diversity of opinion; two groups of five electors each favor *A*, one group of five prefer *B*, another *C*. The selected men would thus stand *A, A, B* and *C*, and the representative unit of the whole would be $(2A+B+C) : 4$. As in the previous case, this complex unit would be reducible to a single individual by casting lots, and it is obvious that the probability of the lot falling upon *A*, would be as two to one.

Thirdly, suppose three groups of five electors desire to be represented by *A* and one group by *B*. In this case we should have $(3A+B) : 4$, as the representative unit: in selecting one of them by lot, there is undoubtedly a possibility of the lot falling upon *B*, but the probability of *A*'s being chosen would be three times greater than the probability in *B*'s case.   True it may be said that there should be no possibility of *B*'s being chosen in a constituency where three-fourths of the electors desire *A*. We must however bear in mind that the primary object is not so much to have particular sections of the country, as to have the whole nation, fairly represented in Parliament. If we look a little further, if we take four constituencies precisely similar to the one under consideration, according to the mathematical theory of probabilities, there would be returned out of the four, three members in sympathy with *A* and one member in sympathy with *B*.   Again, if we carry the matter still further if we take into consideration every one of the constituencies into which for convenience the whole nation may be divided, it would be found as a