

attack for a long time, perhaps never. The mechanism set up in the draft Charter is influenced by the war effort against a definite enemy; it is and always will be sufficient to deal with that enemy. But is there any among us who believes that, when the capacity of Germany, Japan, and Italy is destroyed another war will be impossible? No. We are realists and we fear another war the source of which is absolutely unforeseeable. The mechanism should be effective for any war, against any aggressor. The pointing out of deficiencies in the Proposals which has taken place here is only the indirect expression of the fact that none of our governments believes that aggression can be banished from the world simply by the unconditional surrender of the present aggressors.

But Colombia, like the other countries of America which expressed their thought in the resolutions of Mexico City, has confidence in the will for peace of the United Nations, large and small, victorious in this war. It believes that, in general, the mechanism of Dumbarton Oaks assures a long peace but a provisional one. Colombia believes that the generation which waged the war, which led it and backed it, is capable of keeping the peace. But it also believes that this system is a compromise, as has been said here, between the realities of 1945 and the aspirations of humanity. No American state can think otherwise because the inter-American system, functioning, of course, in a less complex continent, is unquestionably more perfect. The inter-American system proscribes all violence, all acquisition of territory by force, all intervention or interference of one country in the internal affairs of another, all aggression and, furthermore, unequivocally defines the aggressor. Should the latter appear on the scene, the Pan American community would condemn it and apply sanctions by the democratic majority of its representative bodies; there is no privileged vote nor right of veto against such a decision. In accepting a different and less perfect system, we citizens of the Americas would not renounce our system; on the contrary, we would conserve the hope that the whole world might some day be ruled by the principles and procedures which have guaranteed peace, security, justice, and respect to all our nations and which have permitted us to live unarmed. But we are fully aware that if we did not join this world organization, inadequate and imperfect though it might be, we should not be contributing to the peace of the world and that, in any event, we should have to face any war which might break out beyond our hemisphere, through no fault or responsibility of ours.

It was with this criterion that we participated in good faith in the League of Nations. It may not be out

of order to recall that the only two interventions of that organization which stand out as examples of efficiency took place in two cases centering in the Americas: In the conflict between Colombia and Peru, countries which submitted to the decision of the League and one of which had part of its territory administered by authorities of the League until the end of the incident, and the other, with less brilliant results, in the Chaco War.

But, so far as Colombia is concerned, it understands that no regional system like the inter-American one, or any other that might be established on a similar basis, can and should suffer any setback or detriment as long as, like ours, it shows that it is fully consistent with the aims of the general organization and, in addition, shows its efficacy in maintaining the peace and security of part of the world. The inter-American regional system is an old and excellent political institution and it was so recognized very clearly, although badly defined, by the Covenant of the League of Nations as the typical regional system. We citizens of the Americas will never ask for special privileges for our system and I believe that we all agree that, if there were three or four similar ones which guaranteed regional peace with the efficiency which ours has shown, great progress would be made toward permanent universal peace. The regional system must be coordinated with the sole world system and it cannot have different objectives than those of the world organization. But the regional methods, pacific and coercive, which the regional system may employ to guarantee peace or to prevent and punish aggression, so long as they are applied within the spirit of the procedures of the world organization and with the sole purpose of preserving a just peace and the rule of justice, should not be subject to the veto of a single nation if, as is the case with the Pan American system, this right of veto is not granted to any of the nations in the regional group. If there were to be an act of aggression in or against the Americas, all of the countries of the American system should come to the aid of the victim in accordance with our undertakings at Mexico. No nation of the Americas, still less if it were the aggressor, could veto the action taken to prevent or repulse the aggression. On the other hand, within the world organization, a nation foreign to the conflict could do so and arrest the action at any moment with only a single negative vote. Some of us of the American States have well-grounded fears that the presumption that the regional group would be in error and that, on the contrary, the state which has the right to paralyze the group's action cannot be wrong, is too forced