

What we seek is a policy which enables us to share international responsibilities in a spirit of international partnership."

Perhaps I may be forgiven if I say that Canadians like the President's Doctrine rather better than we liked some aspects of his New Economic Policy as enunciated last August 15.

Over the past three years both Canada and the United States have been reviewing their foreign policies. The reasons given for doing so were identical on both sides. We were at the end of an era. The postwar order of international relations was going. With it were going the conditions which had determined the assumptions and practice of our respective foreign policies. The ending of the postwar era had not been a matter of sudden upheaval but of cumulative change over two decades, which, in the aggregate, had transformed the international environment. The task now, we both concluded, was to shape a new foreign policy to meet the requirements of a new era.

In the new scheme of things, both Canada and the United States saw a relative diminished role for themselves. In our case, we argued that our role had been enhanced at a time when Canada had enjoyed a preferred position and a wide range of opportunities as one of the few developed countries to have emerged unscathed, and indeed strengthened, from the Second World War. The Canadian role was bound to be affected by the recovery of our friends and former enemies and by other changes in the configuration of world power.

In your case, it seems to us that you have drawn substantially similar conclusions -- subject, of course, to the very different scope of your role and responsibilities in the world. The Nixon Doctrine is evidence of a growing conviction among Americans that the time has come for others to share a greater portion of the burden of world leadership and its corollary that the assured continuity of United States involvement required a responsible but diminished American role. It is the sense of the Nixon Doctrine that it will enable the United States to remain committed in ways that you can sustain without placing undue stresses upon your human and other resources.

These perceptions on both sides have their counterpart in the role that national objectives and national interests are henceforth to play in the conduct of foreign policy. In the American case, the greater weight to be given to the shorter-term national interest is the function of the diminished role you see for yourselves and of the enhanced capacity and potential of your international partners.

The Canadian foreign policy review, if anything, goes even further. It defines foreign policy as the extension abroad of national policies. The test of a sound foreign policy is the degree of relevance it has to national interests and basic national objectives. The most appropriate policy for the 1970s, therefore, our review concludes, will be one that strengthens and extends sound domestic policies dealing with key national issues.

In sum, the broad premises and underlying perceptions of the two foreign policy reviews are remarkably similar. It is in their implications for two