

ize the Supplementary Reserve, but at present there are no specific procedures for mobilizing this Reserve on the outbreak of hostilities, and it is doubtful whether it would make much of a contribution to the attainment of war-authorized manpower levels.

In addition to having enough Regular and Reserve personnel to meet present war-authorized requirements, Mobile Command must be able to draw on some surplus of trained manpower for reinforcement purposes. This would be necessary if a war in Europe continued beyond the initial stage of a week or so. Such reinforcements could be provided by Militia units, the Supplementary Reserve or new reserve formations such as a Standing Reserve Force or a Ready Reserve. Present capabilities might be improved if the Department of National Defence effectively implements a New Development Plan intended to rejuvenate the reserve forces by requiring Regular Force personnel to join the reserves for a period on release from their units. Trained personnel in various industries and professions could also be listed, so that they could be called on if necessary should a major conflict be imminent.

Mobile Command in the 1980's

In light of the considerations discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter,

The Sub-committee recommends that the Regular Force component of Mobile Command should be increased as follows:

MOBILE COMMAND	:	REGULAR FORCE
<u>Increase from 1981 to 1985</u>		
Current strength		16,000
Make up current shortage		<u>2,500</u>
TOTAL 1985		18,500
<u>Increase from 1985 to 1987</u>		
To cover CAST's domestic duties and the extra rotational needs of a larger force in Europe		<u>4,000</u>
TOTAL 1987		22,500

This assumes that the 2,400 European-augmentation troops, now under Mobile Command, would be transferred to Germany and that 2,400 new Regular troops would replace them in Canada.