

It has been argued, and it is a powerful argument I gather in the East Block, that the real reason for Canada continuing in the military alignment of NATO is so that we can contain West Germany's ambitions both territorial and with respect to gaining nuclear weapons. More recently it has been argued that the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia completely justified that, and I gather that was given as a reason by our present government for not moving faster on any consideration of withdrawal from NATO. I think that argument is not plausible. The intervention of Russia, it seems to me, was a direct response to what Russia considered, rightly or wrongly, a threat emanating from NATO to detach Czechoslovakia from the Communist orbit. So that, objectively, the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia is no different in kind from American intervention in Guatemala or the Dominican Republic or abortively in Cuba. I would agree that it was a reprehensible military action to preserve a sphere of influence, but the point is it was an action of the kind that NATO was never designed to prevent and therefore to use it as a further argument for maintaining NATO, it seems to me, is supremely illogical.

I do not really believe that many Canadians think that West Germany is restrained from military adventures by the fact that we have a few thousand troops in West Germany. It seems to me as part of this argument of non-alignment that it would be fair to put the case on the same grounds as the case for Canada joining OAS, that is to say, the real case is not, should we get out of NATO. The real case is, why are we in? I argue that there are many, many instances of the restrictions which that membership imposes upon us that strongly suggest the desirability of getting out.

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Membership in NATO has been used often to support our support of the American war effort in Viet Nam, and I want to make a particular point about that because sometimes it is said that we are neutral or objective or do not support it. We do, in fact, and any reading of Hansard shows that we support the theoretical argument for the United States being in Viet Nam. Any reading of the American record shows that because Canada gives aid only to South Viet Nam we are listed by, for example, General Westmoreland as a supporter of the United States, and in the Spring of 1967 when 360 professors sought open repudiation by Canada of the American intervention in Viet Nam and a halt to the export of Canadian arms destined for Viet Nam to the United States, and the letter went to Mr. Pearson, Mr. Pearson replied:

Confidential and quiet arguments by a responsible government are usually more effective than

public ones. . . Too many public declarations and disclosures run the risk of complicating matters for those concerned. . . The more complex and dangerous the problem, the greater is the need for calm and deliberate diplomacy.

Well, that is, of course, the classic defence of quiet diplomacy. Presumably, quiet diplomacy went on in 1967 and 1968 but it had no effect, and it seems to me once again what had an effect was the American political crisis and the kind of action that we were proposing then, that is to say, of trying to block the sending of Canadian arms to the United States for use in Viet Nam, would therefore have had more effect on the ending of the war by helping a little bit to precipitate the American political crisis than the quiet diplomacy that presumably was going on.

The other point, if you agree that quiet diplomacy was not terribly effective, was that a very real part of our policy was effective and that was the active promotion of war contracting for the United States in Canada. The Canadian Commercial Corporation did not falter and did not use very quiet diplomacy. It had some very glossy advertisements and pamphlets showing how to get in on the gravy. I wanted to read a quotation again from Mr. Pearson's letter because it seems to me it is at the heart of the matter as to why we are not non-aligned and of what alignment really means, or why we could not openly repudiate the American invasion of Viet Nam. In that letter he first of all reviewed the extent to which our defence production has been integrated and mentioned the technological and mass production advantages we get from that, and went on:

For a broad range of reasons, therefore, it is clear that the imposition of an embargo on the export of military equipment to the United States, and concomitant termination of the Production Sharing Agreements, would have far-reaching consequences which no Canadian government could contemplate with equanimity. It would be interpreted as a notice of withdrawal on our part from continental defence and even from the collective defence arrangements of the Atlantic Alliance.

I think that is as concise and authoritative a statement as we have yet had on the inter-connection between our actual policy and our military alignment. I think that we have to review, then, all of the implications of that military alignment. They are very subtle and they go even beyond that purely economic inter-relationship to which Mr. Pearson referred so pointedly.

They go into almost all areas of our policy and I want to take only one further example. I know it is an irritating one and I do not do it lightly. I think it is an