

On this issue, we in Canada stand on the principles embodied in the Irish resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority at the General Assembly in 1961. We are convinced that proliferation would not occur under the terms of a treaty which required that the present nuclear powers must always retain full control of their nuclear weapons. Perhaps such a treaty, however, should prohibit, clearly and specifically, the transfer of such control to states, groups of states or other entities, requiring that the present nuclear states must at all times maintain the power of veto over deployment and firing of such nuclear weapons.

The nuclear-sharing issue is, of course, closely connected with a second and broader question, that of European security -- which, in its turn, is concerned with the settlement of important political questions on that continent.

While much of the present lack of progress in efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation derives from difficulties about nuclear-sharing and European security, it still seems to me that, in the long run, these questions may prove less intractable than the other problem which I have just mentioned, of the national development of nuclear weapons by states with the technical skill, resources, and industrial base which could enable them to produce such weapons, and who may feel that this is necessary for security reasons.

Your discussions here have shown that, for the non-aligned countries, security assurances to prevent this development raise complex issues affecting their non-aligned status, their relations with the great powers and with their immediate neighbours. In India, for example, which is confronted by a hostile China, these issues are particularly acute and have recently given rise to considerable public discussion. Within the last few weeks, the Foreign Minister of India stated in the Indian Parliament that, if the nuclear powers wished a non-proliferation treaty, they must be prepared themselves to make some sacrifices. Among other things, he went on to recount the merits of a multilateral international guarantee to reassure the non-nuclear countries against nuclear blackmail.

Security assurances of this kind raise important issues, of course, for the nuclear powers. These powers already have commitments to their allies and the acceptance of new commitments might tend to strain their military resources and complicate their political relations with other nuclear powers as well as with rivals of countries to whom a guarantee was extended. While the great powers might be prepared to accept responsibilities commensurate with their status, there are, of course, limits to the responsibilities they can be expected to undertake in this and related fields.

Much attention has been given recently to this whole question of providing the non-aligned countries with adequate assurances about security, which, at the same time, might help to dissuade them from developing their own nuclear weapons. President Johnson made a constructive contribution when he declared, in 1964, that "nations not following the nuclear path will have our strong support against