

And if one includes the Falkland Islanders themselves one can suggest a multilateral phenomenon here and there as well.

The CBMs in question have also followed the Macintosh definition in the sense that they have clearly had as an objective to "reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns." What is interesting in the Falklands case is that there was relatively little requirement for "communicating verifiable evidence those concerns were groundless." One could speculate on the reasons for this important difference from the majority of conflict situations and the CBMs they have engendered. It could be partly the overall political context of cooperation gaining ground throughout the period in which the CBMs were being put in place. It is likely to have been at least partly the general level of mutual respect between the two parties arising from what was surely one of the closest things to a 'gentleman's war' seen in recent decades. And much of what was being done could be verified independently by each of the parties through national or available international means. This is probably worthy of more study.

The CBMs in place did demonstrate that, with the two parties involved, "military and political intentions are not aggressive." Here again, there is room for emphasis on the general political context of a will for cooperation and putting the past behind. In addition, the CBMs in place clearly did provide some degree of early-warning indicators and the desire was obviously to create confidence.

Finally, the CBMs did "restrict the opportunities for the use of military force" and did so "by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces within the sensitive areas." Notifications, communication requirements, zones, codes of conduct, and a number of other elements of the CBMs applying in the Falklands case provided just such restrictions.

As mentioned, the objective here was also to see if there were some lessons to be drawn from the Falklands context which might be useful for the future of building of confidence in the bilateral or even trilateral relationship in the South Atlantic, as well as some of utility for wider inter-American and international conflict situations. The following 'lessons learned' constitute the results of the findings of this study in this regard.

For the Anglo-Argentine Bilateral Relationship

Confidence building has proven a highly effective way of helping pave the way to reduced tensions in the highly emotional dispute over the Falkland Islands.

Specific measures, when designed with care, can do a great deal to create confidence, and reduce concerns about the other side's intentions.

It is possible to borrow some ideas from other communities and their security contexts. While this must be done with care and attention to detail, the tendency to deny any legitimacy to