from which free Asian countries feel that they have been excluded. Surely we must recognize that, whether we agree with all their policies or not, little of a substantial or permanent character is likely to be achieved in establishing peace and security in Southeast Asia, or any other part of Asia, without the advice, co-operation and assistance of the free Asian countries. I think it is most important - and I am sure the House agrees with me - that those countries should feel that, even if they are not members of it, any collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia that may be worked out should be in their interest, and have taken into consideration their interests. If not enough Asian states feel that way, the foundation of any Southeast Asian security organization will not be very firm.

"In this connection, the Commonwealth association can play and has played a valuable role. And that is one reason why, in my opinion, it was helpful and wise to keep the Asian members of Commonwealth informed, as they were kept informed, closely and continuously, of Geneva developments. It is also one reason why I regret that India, or some similar Asian state or states, was not a member of the Geneva Conference.

## WILL TAKE TIME

"The working out of an arrangement which would be based on the considerations I have ventured to mention will not be easy, and I think that it will take time. But there is dilemma here, in that time may be against those who desire to build up a security system to deter aggression in Southeast Asia. After all, there is a war going on there. It is not easy, in diplomacy, to reconcile considerations of defence urgency with the necessity for careful political preparation and of securing general and wholehearted agreement. There can be danger both from over-timidity and from over-zealousness. There can also be trouble between friends if there is doubt about timing, about exactly what is being planned, about what we are trying to secure, and about what we are trying to prevent.

"We should certainly be clear on that last point - what we are trying to prevent. Is the united action which it is desired to bring about to be against Communism as such, regardless of the means, military or otherwise, which it adopts to secure its ends in any particular Asian country; or is the commitment for collective action against military aggression only? If it is to be the first, then we should realize that arrangements to achieve this end will be interpreted as a declaration of implacable and fixed hostility, with all action short of general war, and even at the risk of such war, against Asian Communism.

"The other concept is that which is embodied in NATO. Here the commitment for action, in contradistinction to consultation, is clear and explicit. And it comes into operation as

soon as a military aggression has been committed by one state against another - but not sooner.

"I do not think it will do any service to the unity of those who are working together for peace if there is not a very clear understanding on this point, and if any negotiations are not based upon that understanding.

"Now, if I may close by referring a little more specifically to the policy of the Canadian Government in respect to the questions we have been discussing at Geneva, and which are still under discussion there.

"We will continue - and I am sure there will be general agreement on this - we will continue to assist in bringing about a Korean peace settlement, consistent with United Nations principles and decisions; but we will not repudiate or betray those principles or decisions.

"If the Geneva Conference should not at this time achieve such a settlement, we will favour a re-examination of the problem at a future date, whether at the United Nations General Assembly or by a resumption of the present Conference called for that purpose.

"We will oppose any move by anyone to resume hostilities in Korea.

## REAL INTEREST

"So far as Indo-China and Southeast Asia are concerned, we recognize that Canada has a very real interest in what is happening there, and what is likely to happen there. As a country with hundreds of miles of exposed coast on the Pacific, Canada is naturally concerned with problems affecting security in the Pacific and in Asia. Moreover, we know from the experience of two world wars that peace is indivisible and that a threat to peace anywhere can soon cover the whole world.

"Our inevitable concern for developments in Southeast Asia is increased by our close relationship to the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the three Asian members of the Commonwealth. The growing anxiety of these latter three over hostilities going on so near to their homelands can be readily appreciated, since their security would be very seriously threatened if an aggressive communist nation took control, either by internal subversion or by direct military intervention, of one after another of the countries in the area.

"Added evidence of our concern for the security and well-being of the nations of South and Southeast Asia is to be found in our active participation in the Colombo Plan, whereby we have sought to associate ourselves with the area's economic development.

"In so far as accepting special political and defence commitments is concerned, there is of course a limit to whata country of Canada's population and resources can do. We have limited strength, in both men and materials; and our commitments are already heavy. Existing undertakings, such as those under NATO, are