

chemical industry, however, may be very difficult because of the widespread availability of chemical plant and materials.

The IAEA has never used the broader definition of the proliferation problem (i.e., the spread of the capacity to make nuclear weapons). Its dual objectives of providing assistance as well as safeguards tend to rule such a broader definition out. Moreover, the Agency's composition and political functioning would probably not allow it to develop or sustain such a definition. Instead, both in general and within the NPT, attempts to control the spread of nuclear weapon-making capacity have been led by certain supplier states and have largely occurred outside the Agency, which has been used as a channel of communication to recipient states. These supplier efforts have been a source of strain in the non-proliferation regime, being seen by some (including some suppliers as well as recipients) as renegeing on supply obligations. Supplier policies outside of or in addition to Agency safeguards can strengthen controls by filling gaps in the Agency's mandate and powers. However, they can also be seen to limit legitimacy of the Agency as a verification body.

The definitional problems of proliferation can encourage undesirable supply-safeguards linkages and the development of additional functions in a monitoring body. In the nuclear field, although safeguards are a condition of supply, the linkage now seems to be reversing: states want assurances of access in return for accepting safeguards burdens. If there are no access advantages that follow from accepting safeguards, the attractiveness of safeguards is diminished. The Agency has only limited advantages it can offer in its technical assistance, and it is not clear whether parties to the NPT have access advantages relative to non-parties. Such linkage issues could develop in a chemical weapons regime.

The Agency's experience also raises the possibility that a verification agency could be given a role in the supply of assistance. It could be argued that such a function could encourage membership in the agency, and if membership implied accepting safeguards (it does not in the IAEA) it would support the achievement of an agreement's arms control objectives. However, such a function would also have other effects on the structure, operations, politics and financing of such an agency, as the experience of the IAEA demonstrates. The two main Agency functions of safeguarding and providing technical assistance create competing objectives, serve different constituencies, and thus blur the Agency's identity and the criteria for its evaluation. They also increase the level and diversity of resources needed by the Agency. The distribution of resources between safeguards and technical assistance has been the subject of disputes in budget and policy debates. Similar effects could be expected for a chemical weapons verification agency if it had an assistance function. It would seem broadly desirable, therefore, to have a verification agency performing a single, well-defined task, with any other functions assigned to it clearly secondary and supplementary to that primary task.

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