

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

As a matter of fact, the question of reasonably differentiated approaches appears to be one of the most important in the future work on the convention. The discussions in the contact groups go deeper and deeper into individual issues. In the course of such a process there is a natural tendency to reach the highest possible level of perfection of a particular proposed procedure. Doing this one might easily forget the broader context, and fail to see a realistic balance between a given implementation provision and the reasonably evaluated real importance of the given issue.

The destruction of stocks may serve as an example of that problem.

As is well known, some delegations proposed for this purpose a complex of sophisticated procedures. Such a complex would include the monitoring of all the steps of the technological process by a number of sensors and automatically operating television cameras, a continuous on-site inspection performed by a whole group of international inspectors, a great number of laboratory tests, and so on.

All this has been suggested in order to verify that the State which has declared its stocks of chemical weapons really destroys them. I must admit that my delegation has some difficulties in seeing why the declared stocks should not be destroyed. It seems more logical to consider the destruction of declared old stocks of chemical weapons one of the most simple tasks for verification.

At the same time, a real danger for international security could be potentially posed, e.g. by the undeclared production of some chemicals, which could eventually be deployed in multi-component chemical weapons systems, by the civilian chemical industry.

There seems to be little doubt that the only verification measure practically applicable with regard to such a very serious situation would be an on-challenge inspection -- that is something, considered by some delegations as "absolutely insufficient and unacceptable" for such a simple task as the destruction of known stocks. An imbalance between these two approaches is evident.

The issue of precursors might serve as another example.

The concept of precursors is needed in the convention for two main purposes: (1) to cover -- as far as declarations and destruction are concerned -- the chemical components of binary and/or multi-component chemical weapons systems, and (2) to cover the commercial production of chemicals which could potentially be misused for creating new chemical weapons in the future.

From a chemical point of view, precursors are all intermediate chemicals participating in the process of the chemical synthesis of the end-product.

It would be not only impractical but virtually impossible to deal with the whole spectrum of potential precursors, which are innumerable. Also, the interference with the interests of the peaceful civilian chemical industry would be enormous, and many delegations have already expressed their principal objections to any measures which could restrict the free development of the chemical industry.

It seems much more appropriate to choose only key precursors, and of those, only the key precursors of supertoxic chemicals to be dealt with in the convention. Our delegation contributed to this problem in document CD/CW/CRP.83, issued on 19 July of this year, in which we tried to define the main areas where the concept