

intellect, would have dictated and counseled the better choice; and yet the man had a mind or will that impelled him to make a different choice, and so accept the consequences which would follow. In this office of the mind, we may trace understanding, for without this there could not be a comprehension of the evidences to which it had access, which the intellect had received and arranged for it to use; also memory and recollection, or the will would ever have to go to the intellect as a text book, and be continually searching for its authority to act; it also has opinion, sentiment, judgment, belief, inclination, desire, liking, intent, purpose, courage, spirit, for all these are necessary concomitants to action in any direction, whether in the right and proper use of the evidences received, whether they relate to man's physical, his moral, or his spiritual duties, or to the mere gratification of his animal passions or desires. Hence I conclude they are only adjuncts or faculties of mind or will, and not the mind or will itself.

Are these faculties or adjuncts of mind only in possession of man; or is man the only form of animal life, that has mind becomes a question of no inconsiderable importance?

The close observer of what we term the brute creation cannot have failed to discover that scarcely any species can be found in which there are not some traces of understanding, memory, remembrance, desire, courage, choice, intent, purpose and will.

We will take for example the horse, it was of this animal the question that suggested these thoughts was asked: That he has understanding must be patent to all who have given the subject attention, he knows his owner's voice, he can be taught to start or stop at the word, to turn either to the right or left by the crack of a whip without a word being spoken, or, as is generally the case, by the pulling of the rein, and after being so taught will always obey the same sign in the same manner.

We call this teaching breaking, but it is simply conveying to the understanding what we want him to do; he is also capable of acquiring habits which are sometimes the results of the craving for food or drink. He soon learns to know his home, his particular stall in the stable, and will greet the coming of his caretaker with a low whinnie as an expression of the understanding that he is to be fed. While some show a great tractability, and are easily brought under the control of man, others manifest what we call stubbornness, which is nothing more or less than a stronger will, which refuses to be subjected. In their wild state they show intent, purpose, memory and understanding in their manner of grouping together in herds, and in the selection in some manner of a leader or general. They show too in many forms that desire for self-preservation and protection which is common to all animal life.

Hence with the idea I entertain that mind is the impelling force to action in man. It seems equally true in the lower forms of animal life. But the evidences upon which that mind acts is furnished them by a law we call instinct, which can only furnish one form of evidences, and they such as pertain to the physical only.

In man, were not the intellect a faculty that could compare thing with thing, arrange and classify evidences, it would be but little more than instinct, for apart from the evidences furnished through the spiritual nature it would only have to do with that which pertains to the physical like instinct, for those adjuncts of the mind, such as understanding, memory, recollection, intent, purpose, desire, courage, spirit, are all needed for the proper performance of the functions of physical life; but intellect is capable of receiving evidences of a moral and spiritual nature, and so while the understanding of the mind of the man is far superior to that of the horse or any other animal, while his memory embraces a wider range and