

Questioning the "Obligation"

members of the Alliance have undertaken that once such a request is made they will participate in the consultation.

The arguments for NATO renouncing the first-use of nuclear weapons and for the United States renouncing the Star Wars program have been put in many articles and speeches in North Atlantic countries. Two of the most impressive articles are by four leading American authorities on international affairs writing in *Foreign Affairs*: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Gerard Smith and George Kennan. McNamara was Secretary of Defence from 1961 to 1968. Bundy was special assistant to the President for national security affairs from 1961 to 1966. Smith was chief of the American delegation to the strategic arms limitation talks from 1969 to 1972. Kennan was ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952 and to Yugoslavia from 1961 to 1963. They set forth their views on no first-use in *Foreign Affairs* for Spring 1982 and their views on Star Wars in the issue for Winter 1984-85.

In the first article they state: "Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, by the Alliance or against it, carries

with it a high and inescapable risk of escalation into the general nuclear war which would bring ruin to all and victory to none . . . [In] the age of massive thermonuclear overkill it no longer makes sense — if it ever did — to hold these weapons for any other purpose than the prevention of their use" by the other side. They contend in the second article that "there is literally no hope that Star Wars can make nuclear weapons obsolete . . . Star Wars, in sum, is a prescription not for ending or limiting the threat of nuclear weapons, but for a competition [with the Soviet Union] unlimited in expense, duration and danger." They believe that it is possible to reach good arms control agreements with the Soviet Union or "to insist on the Star Wars program as it stands, but wholly impossible to do both."

If discussion of these two issues at a meeting of the heads of government of the North Atlantic countries should eventually result in a renunciation by NATO and the Warsaw Pact of the first-use of nuclear weapons and of Star Wars programs the future of the world would be less bleak. □

An underappreciated Canadian Dead at 88

E.L.M Burns: soldier and peacekeeper

by Michael J. Tucker

This article on General Burns, who died in October 1985 at the age of eighty-eight, is presented by International Perspectives not as an obituary, but as a preliminary statement of a fullscale study-in-progress by Michael Tucker, Professor of Political Science at Mount Allison University in Sackville, New Brunswick.

In the late 1950s perceptive officials in the United Nations and the Defence Liaison Divisions of the Department of External Affairs became increasingly disturbed by what they saw as a profound lack of understanding in Canada about the possible implications of technological innovation for international peace and stability. This lacuna, it seemed, was on two fronts: Canadians and others did not appreciate that the deployment by both East and West of battlefield nuclear weapons in the European theatre, under the doctrine of limited nuclear war, could well mean widespread civilian deaths. Nor did they seem to appreciate the possibility of Canadian complicity, even if inadvertent, in the undermining of the then-embryonic nuclear non-proliferation regime which Ottawa's peaceful

nuclear exports policy was directed to. While staunchly resisted by others within the Department of External Affairs (DEA) and from within other departments in Ottawa, these officials began to press Cabinet for the establishment of a separate Disarmament Division within External Affairs. Their hope was that this Division would become the locus for strategic, technological and scientific expertise — and thus bureaucratic authority — upon which the dangerous and delusive notion of limited nuclear war, and the equally dangerous habit on the part of supplier states of exporting "peaceful" nuclear materials without strong safeguards, could be challenged at home and abroad.

Soldier turns diplomat

The Disarmament Division was not to be established forthwith, and when it was, in May 1961, it was never to gain the degree of expertise, much less the sort of control over Canada's military and peaceful nuclear policies, that the DEA activists of the late 1950s had hoped it would. And, while the bureaucratic momentum was there, the birth of the Division as the institutional expression of the Canadian commitment to the disarmament ideal owed much to the acumen and tenacity of one individual. Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns — "Tommy" Burns, as his friends and