

*Supply—External Affairs*

of course basic. Some other problems, particularly that of assisting the peoples of the less developed countries to advance into full participation in mankind's heritage of dignity, freedom and welfare are no less difficult and in the long run even more important, but it is relations with the communist countries which have involved the risk of war and have demanded the diversion to defence of vast resources which, in a more settled world, could be used for the purposes of instruction and well being.

It is therefore with some sense of satisfaction that one can compare the general international situation today with what it was a year ago. At that time the world stood on the very brink of nuclear war as the result of a sudden, secret deployment of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba. We now know, as I am sure the right hon. Leader of the Opposition would confirm, that a year ago, in what Mr. Gromyko has referred to as the Caribbean situation, the nations looked for the first time right down into the pit of nuclear fire. That Soviet clandestine move produced the most dangerous crisis of the post-war period but it was one which I believe may mark a new chapter in east-west relations. Happily, that situation was resolved in a way which not only avoided open conflict but opened up new avenues for reducing tensions. It was typical of the late president of the United States that at the peak of that crisis he had the foresight to speak of peace.

But the major political problems of the world remain, in Germany, in Indo-China, in Cuba. The problem of Berlin access is with us still, as recent tense moments on the autobahn have reminded us. These and other problems caused by Stalin's division of Germany and Europe remain as grave sources of tension in the world, potentially as dangerous as Cuba. So when I speak of satisfaction at the improvement in the world political situation during the past year, I do not suggest that there are any grounds for complacency. Critical problems in adjusting relations between the communist and the non-communist worlds remain. Of course it is not possible to define precisely what prompted the Soviet authorities to co-operate in concluding certain limited, tension-easing agreements, of which the partial test ban treaty is the most significant, after some years of refusing these same proposals. Doubtless a variety of factors entered into the decision. One Soviet motive may have been a desire to reduce the risk of war; for there is no question in my mind but that the Soviet people, like our own, ardently desire peace and that Cuba was a sobering lesson for everyone. Another motive was, I think, economic, since the partial test ban treaty seems likely to limit the extension of

the arms race into even more sophisticated and expensive areas of development. The Soviet leaders probably also share with us a desire to discourage the dissemination of nuclear weapons under the independent control of more and more governments, a development which could vastly increase the danger of accidental war and make much more complicated, and perhaps hopeless, the prospect of achieving disarmament.

Evolution within the communist bloc may have exerted considerable influence. In eastern Europe the Soviet union's allies now enjoy a greater freedom to manoeuvre than was possible a few years ago. I think this was highlighted the other day when my colleague the Minister of Trade and Commerce and I received in our offices a member of the government of Bulgaria who had come to Canada to discuss with us matters involved in a prospective trade treaty. Although on key international issues such as disarmament and Germany and Berlin the bloc countries give apparently unquestioning support to the Soviet union, it is nevertheless evident that on internal policy relating to collectivization of agriculture, de-Stalinization, and so on, and on bloc economic policies, there are variations which indicate clearly that differing national requirements and interests are more and more taken into account.

Moreover, there seems to be some increase in the realism of the Soviet leaders on the essential issues of Soviet-western relations, and this realism may make possible in due course limited agreements on a number of other issues to complement and consolidate the relaxation begun by the achievement of the limited test ban agreement. The dialogue between the Soviet union and the United States, as the leading representative of the west, has been resumed and it is to continue, as President Johnson's first message to Chairman Khrushchev indicated yesterday.

Now, sir, a major factor in Soviet thinking, of course, is the problem of its relations with communist China. While we have long known that there were serious differences between the Soviet union and China, and that China has never been a true satellite of the Soviet union, the new element is the unrestrained public disclosure of the extent of the rift. The dispute now appears to have been carried into the field of interstate relations, affecting economic, political and possibly even territorial aspects. It would be unwise, of course, to judge how far these differences may yet be carried, for the sobering fact is that they are still agreed as to their basic aim, the extension of communism throughout the world. Their differences are related primarily to the means by which this aim can best be achieved,