

us on the other. Nor has that deadlock anything to do with the fact that one side has or has not a monopoly of atomic energy.

It has been obvious for many years that no single nation could long have a monopoly in atomic weapons because no single nation has, or can have, a monopoly in brains, or wisdom or energy. This point was made clear in the 1945 Three-Power statement to which I have referred. The United Nations policy on atomic energy has been developed on this assumption. The recent atomic explosion in the Soviet Union does, however, point up dramatically the validity of the thesis that security can be found only in effective international control. Nations on both sides of the chasm which at present so tragically divides the world now have the secret of the power which can smash that world. In an atmosphere of tension and fear and mistrust, that knowledge is being harnessed to the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. This is the supreme menace that faces us, and it will increase if an atomic arms race is allowed to continue. The stock piles will grow, giving a fitful sense of security on one side, and threatening insecurity to the other. Your defence becomes my danger, and my defensive reaction to that danger seems to threaten your security.

There is, of course, only one final solution to this problem; the development of political conditions that will make war unnecessary and hence unthinkable. If war does come, international control of atomic energy will disappear along with every other kind of control. It is idle and misleading to cite to the contrary the Geneva poison gas conventions. No gas bomb ever killed 50,000 persons or held out such a terrible temptation to total and quick victory as atomic supremacy does. In any event, surely no one is going to argue in this Assembly that the Nazis, who broke every other law of God and man, observed the poison gas convention out of a decent regard for international morality and the observance of international conventions.

Yet it is defeatism to think we can do nothing except sit back and hope that war won't occur. We can remove some of the fear and insecurity that breeds conflict by taking the development of atomic energy for destructive purposes out of the individual control of national governments and turning it over to an international agency which will act, by agreement, as a trustee for the separate nations. This, to us, seems to be the only way to ensure that at least there will never be in the future an atomic Pearl Harbor or an atomic June 22, 1941. It removes the menace of a sudden, surprise atomic aggression. On this principle the "majority plan" rests. It is also the principle that has inspired the Resolution which you have before you in the name of the French and Canadian delegations.

How can we work out an international arrangement based on this principle? At the present, the two camps are deadlocked on this issue. How can we break that deadlock? The answer to this question - it will have to be more political than technical - will not be easy to find. We know that now, but we must try to find it.

The resolution which the French and Canadian delegations have put forward lays down certain principles which in our view should be accepted if progress is to be made. It also provides for a new and vigorous examination of the problem by the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission. This new examination must be made in the light of present circumstances, one of the most important of which is the insistent demand of the people and the governments represented at this Assembly that, to use General Romulo's words again, "the means for controlling the