

artillery pieces, verification of combat power will depend on personnel strength rather than weapon counts. Counting weapons will be difficult, and will not provide a reliable indication of the number of personnel.

It seems unlikely that personnel strength will ever be verifiable to a very high degree of accuracy. But as a measure of military strength, it does not need to be known with great precision. More significant than current numbers would be clear evidence of a substantial increase, possibly an indication of mobilization. Here again, synergy should be available by combining direct observation with information collected by a variety of other means.

Arms Transfers

An opportunity to control the proliferation of armaments is presented at the stage of international transfers. The transfer of nuclear weapons is explicitly forbidden by the NPT. At various times certain countries have placed embargoes on export of arms to particular nations (for example, US, Britain, and France against Egypt in 1950, US and Britain against India and Pakistan in 1965, US against Iran between 1984 and 1988). Many industrialized nations have statutory regulations regarding military exports. Negotiations to limit conventional arms transfers held between the USA and the Soviet Union in 1977 and 1978 proved abortive. However, there are examples of groups of industrialized nations attempting to control exports of conventional weapons and their related technology, and recent instances of efforts towards this goal by the United Nations.

The Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was formed in 1949 by NATO countries together with Japan and Australia, to control the export of technology of strategic significance, directed primarily against the USSR, China, and their allies. Strongly influenced by the USA, a list of Militarily Critical Technologies is maintained, together with lists of munitions, items related to atomic weapons,

and items capable of dual use for military and civilian purposes. Attention is paid to re-export to undesired destinations. Restrictions have been eased in recent years, and a CoCom Cooperation Forum has been formed in which most of the countries formerly proscribed have been invited to participate. There is no treaty, and the discussions and decisions are taken in secret. The group can wield sanctions through the power to withhold critical exports from countries or commercial organizations. A form of cooperative verification occurred when Czechoslovakia issued permanent visas in 1990 for American on-site inspectors to ensure that imported sensitive technologies were not being re-exported or diverted to military use.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has already been described in relation to verification regimes associated with weapons of mass destruction. The objects of control are ballistic missiles with payloads of over 500 kg, or ranges of more than 300 km, and of technologies needed for advanced missiles. If these performance characteristics were reduced, it might become possible for the MTCR to address the proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles armed with conventional payloads.

The five nations holding permanent membership on the UN Security Council contribute 88% of global armament exports. This group has begun meetings on restraining the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well as massive buildups of conventional weapons. They are to draft guidance on export of all conventional weapons, and exchange information on transfers to the Middle East.

In 1988 the United Nations General Assembly issued a call to increase openness in the buying and selling of weapons. A resolution passed in December 1991 established a global register of arms sales, to begin in 1993, and to include main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, combat aircraft and helicopters, large-calibre

