

Mr. Leventhal then turned to the lessons to be drawn from the Iraq crisis. First, he said, the NPT had facilitated the transfer of dangerous products to Iraq and had failed to prevent Saddam Hussein from conducting his nuclear programme. Then, IAEA guarantees failed to reveal in time the diversion of highly fissionable materials by Iraq and to detect its secret nuclear activities. Finally, the Iraq case demonstrated the difficulty of rolling back a country's nuclear capability. It was evident that Iraq had concealed materials and technologies for building the bomb and that it played a cat-and-mouse game with international inspectors. An Iraqi defector eventually revealed the existence of an enriched uranium programme based on old calutron technology, a programme the Western countries knew nothing about.

Mr. Leventhal drew the following conclusions from his analysis of the international non-proliferation system and the Iraq crisis:

- Measures for controlling exports need to be strengthened, though without damaging other aspects of non-proliferation. We should not attempt to control dual-purpose technologies, but should concentrate instead on nuclear materials that are not subject to international controls such as tritium, heavy water, natural uranium and calutrons.
- Good intelligence about nuclear activities and the ability to react quickly are more effective non-proliferation tools than export controls. Methods should be developed to enable the Security Council to take action against exporters and importers who engage in activities which further nuclear proliferation and to avoid in this way other confrontations like the Iraq crisis.
- Close attention should be paid to repairing the deficiencies in the IAEA and NPT systems. In particular, the frequency of IAEA inspections should be increased because, under the present circumstances, countries have sufficient