

should know that they are less vulnerable to the dangers of a surprise attack because they are assured of warning."²⁶

Writing in another article, Alford makes some further points about CBMs, continuing to argue that their most important attribute is that they clarify military intentions. He says that CBMs are:

"measures that tend to make military intentions explicit. ... [CBMs should] permit both sides to differentiate clearly between actions intended to be seen as hostile and those that are not. ... They are intended to help separate unambiguous signals of hostile intent from the random noise of continuous military activity. ... [T]he degree of confidence primarily depends on the degree of openness and transparency with which states are prepared to conduct their political and military affairs."²⁷

Speaking quite specifically about the potential of CBMs to assist in the negotiation of a meaningful MBFR agreement, Lawrence Freedman focuses on one basic interpretation of CBMs, treating them as if they are synonymous with Associated Measures. He says that CBMs:

"have been seized upon as the last best hope of arms control. They are presented as addressing the real issue, fear of surprise attack, rather than the more artificial question of force levels. The focus is on the factors that actually shape each side's perceptions, an approach which suggests a political benefit of more relaxed relations resulting directly from the military benefit of a reduced threat of surprise attack."²⁸

Later in the same monograph, Freedman adds some further observations about the nature of Confidence-Building Measures:

"The theory and practice of CBM imply two quite distinct effects. Over time some measures are supposed to lead to a form of military, and possibly political, detente. If, however, relations move in exactly the opposite direction, towards a major crisis, other measures might calm the situation by preventing defensive military moves from being misinterpreted and impeding preparations for a surprise attack. In this second sense, *CBM would operate as classic arms control, reinforcing the shared interest in avoiding war despite strong mutual antagonism*. The two roles are not wholly contradictory in that a demonstration of the implausibility of surprise attack has been considered the foundation of military stability and thus detente." (Emphasis added)²⁹

Hans Gunter Brauch makes a widely acknowledged, standard (but not necessarily correct) point when he notes that:

"agreements on CBMs do not directly affect the size, the weaponry, and the structure of armed forces. They only restrict the availability of forces, their activities, and their deployments in certain areas. They aim at more *transparency* in order to avoid misperceptions and wrong reactions and to increase the predictability of the behaviour of both sides. CBMs may be more easily negotiable than arms control agreements."³⁰

Adam Rotfeld is a particularly keen observer of the CBM scene. He concentrates on the psy-

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²⁶ Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects," in Jonathan Alford (ed), *The Future of Arms Control: Part III - Confidence-Building Measures* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 5.

²⁷ Jonathan Alford, "The Usefulness and the Limitations of CBMs," in William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld (eds.), *New Directions in Disarmament* (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 134-135.

²⁸ Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Control in Europe* (London: Chatham House Papers, 1981), p. 29.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 35.

³⁰ Hans Gunter Brauch, "Confidence-Building and Disarmament-Supporting Measures," in Epstein and Feld, *New Directions in Disarmament*, pp. 145-146.

