

should be capable of immediate expansion." How are these conditions to be obtained? There is only one means, and it is the method adopted by Prussia after the peace of Tilsit, 1807, when she was only allowed by Napoleon to maintain a standing army of 42,000 men, and was then left, as he thought, incapable of further serious action against him. The means Prussia adopted were short army service and reserve service; thus with a standing army of 40,000 men, enlisted for 5 years, 2 being with the colors and 3 being with the reserve, a country would require 20,000 recruits every year, and could, neglecting waste, on mobilization turn out 100,000 trained men. At the present time almost all the continental powers have adopted the same plan. We have adopted the same principle, but owing to the special necessities of Greater Britain, *i.e.*, of the entire empire, and to our system of voluntary instead of universal service, we have been unable to make our period with the colors as short as it is in the case of Germany (2 years) or France (3 years). Before 1872 the period of service was for 12 years, and re-engagement was encouraged to complete 21 years; we had naturally no reserves. The period of enlistment is now 7 years with the colors and 5 years in the reserve, or, in case a man's 7 years terminated abroad, 8 years with the colors and 4 years with the reserve. Whilst he is in the reserve he receives a retaining fee, so to speak, of 6d. a day. I have insufficient time to say much about this reserve system, but wish to point out that in the present times, considering the immense continental armies, it is absolutely necessary to adopt some means of expanding the numbers of the Regulars on mobilization, *i.e.*, of bringing up the establishments from their peace strength to their war strength, and further of replacing casualties during a war without taking men from other regiments. The Crimea gave us a severe lesson: an excellent army of some 25,000 men was sent out, but when casualties came and reinforcements were required there were no means of supplying the want, except by taking volunteers from other battalions; then these denuded battalions had to be sent, filled up with raw recruits.

Another point, too. The change from peace strength to war strength ought to be almost automatic, to take place when required without confusion and with great rapidity. The 1866 war is a good example of this, where we see that the Prussians became masters of Austria within seven weeks of crossing the frontier. A reservist should, as a matter of course, be able to take his place instantly on mobilization in his old regiment under the same officers who drilled, and paid and punished him when with the colors.

The second important change, which brought about the Modern System in the United Kingdom, was the "territorializing" the army. That change is partly connected with the reserves. I have endeavored to show you that they are a

necessity, and further, that when required on mobilization they must be obtained with the utmost rapidity. To effect this they must be looked after by some one during their reserve service, and they should have some rendezvous station to join at on mobilization. Who should that some one be? and where should the rendezvous station be? Another question: Considering that more than half of our line battalions are always abroad, who at home is to obtain recruits for them? and seeing that no soldier is allowed to go to India, where there are 78,000 English soldiers, until he is 20 years old, and that men are enlisted at 18 years old and upwards, who is to train these young soldiers before they join their battalion abroad?

These questions were solved by various committees between 1859 and 1872 as follows, although the solution was not finally adopted until 1881. The various battalions of regulars were linked together in couples, one to be serving abroad and one at home—this suited existing arrangements fairly well—and to each double battalion was given a district from which to recruit. At the headquarters of each district was formed a depot, the O.C.; this regimental district was charged with the recruiting for and the looking after the reserves of both battalions. On mobilization the reservists join at the depot. The training of the young soldier before he joins a battalion abroad is done by the sister battalion at home. It should be noticed that a recruit enlists for service in either battalion of his territorial regiment, and having joined one is liable to be transferred to the other, but not to any other corps; this plan also applies to officers, who may be transferred from the 1st to the 2nd, or from the 2nd to the 1st battalion of the same regiment. This plan necessitated the abolition of the old and time-honored regimental numbers, which was of course a severe but unavoidable wrench, and the substitution of territorial names. The modern system of reserves and short army service entails many recruits; this implies continual drill and instruction, but the battalions abroad should always be ready for immediate service, and therefore should not possess too many young soldiers in the ranks, and consequently the home battalions become to a great extent schools of instruction and feeders for the army abroad. The advantages claimed for the "territorialization" or the "localization" scheme, as it is called, are (1) recruiting simplified, (2) less desertion, (3) increased *esprit de corps*, as recruits for a territorial regiment would mostly be drawn from the same district; (4) mobilization of the reserves facilitated, as they would as a rule be living in the same part of the country where they enlisted, *i.e.*, near the headquarters, the depot of their territorial regiment.

The third change I mentioned was the fusing together of the Regulars and Auxiliaries. As yet this can be said to have taken place only with regard to the Mili-

ta, the various battalions of which form the 2nd and 4th battalions of the territorial regiment and bear the same name. The change has been most beneficial to the Militia, who now feel that they have a firm connection with the Regulars. A permanent staff (Adjutant, Quartermaster, and about 30 N.C.O.'s) are appointed to each Militia battalion from the battalions of Regulars; militiamen are encouraged to enlist in the regular battalions; officers of the regular battalions are encouraged on retirement to join the Militia battalions. By these and other means an *esprit de corps* is promoted in the Militia battalions and a new vigor imparted to them, so that there is every reason to suppose that in case of national danger they will prove a valuable second line of defence.

Up to the present I have attempted to explain very shortly the system by which the English army is recruited and by which it can be expanded from peace strength to war strength, and maintained at that strength, *i.e.*, by means of reserves, which necessitate a territorial regiment of two battalions of regulars. I have only spoken of the Infantry battalions of the line, since they form the vast majority of our troops. The Artillery is recruited in a somewhat similar manner; the Cavalry cannot as yet be said to be territorialized.

Well, let us suppose that our system for the supply and maintenance of men is in good working order, how are the various battalions to be grouped together into larger combinations for fighting purposes? To answer this question the War Office authorities want information as to what combinations are required of them? What is the size of the army that the country wishes to have maintained in addition to the soldiers in India and the Colonies? The replies given are that if all the available troops, regulars, reserves and auxiliaries are mobilized there should be:

1. A field army of 3 Army Corps and 4 Cavalry Brigades. Of this army the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, to be composed of Regulars, the 3rd of Militia; also part of them, about 20,000 men, to be taken from the troops quartered at Aldershot and to be continually ready to form a Field Force for service abroad; the idea being to be able to send abroad a small army for any of our colonial wars without dislocating military arrangements throughout the entire country.

2. A reserve Field Army composed of Volunteers for home defence.

3. Garrisons for local defence of important fortified ports or commercial harbors.

In detailing and appropriating the various corps for each of these services the War Office finds no difficulty with regard to actual numbers of soldiers, but difficulty does arise with regard to another point as follows:—Suppose that the battalions of infantry stationed at any given time at a given place, say Plymouth, are detailed to form the 2nd bri-