EXCELSIOR.

"We admit," we quote again, "that the operation of the senses produces in us strong convictions of reality, but we deny that this conviction amounts to knowledge in the absolute sense, for knowledge so-called received through the sense is mediate knowledge, and therefore liable to doubt. It will be clear, then, that the senses afford no rule or criterion of certainty." Why mediate, and why liable to doubt? We hardly feel called upon to refute the theory of Innate Ideas, and if the writer admit that no ideas are given us with our being, what knowledge can be more direct than that received through the senses, a knowledge prior to which we have none? Nor do we suppose that - to use his pet term - the writer's belief in idealism would dictate his actions. We ask anyone to tell us in all candor whether when standing on a railway track, a short distance in front of a moving train, his senses would not produce in him absolute knowledge of the advisability of granting it right of way. The upholder of this unique doctrine of the mutual independence of belief and knowledge, the former of which he calls "the ground of our activity," may reply that he believes the engine will not step aside for him, though his knowledge that there is an engine there at all admits of doubt. But belief and doub, we ircompatible; they cannot subsist in the same subject coucerning the same object. We may believe the possibility of a thing, and *doubt* its probability, but the two cannot come together. We submit that this is a little clearer than "that the senses afford no rule or criterion of certainty," which is not, in its author's philosophy, so clear as to amount to knowledge, and is only belief in which he detects a sprinkling of doubt !

There are in the article many other passages which we should like to submit to the tests of logic and consistency, but our space is limited; and moreover we think we have said enough to show that we have failed "to grasp the truth" (?) of the distinction between belief and knowledge. We know not whether our opponent will class us among those "educated persons who injure themselves by a too constant contemplation of the negative side of the case," or

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