

in question. The attempt may be wise under some circumstances. It may be unwise under others. The real question at issue is as follows: A certain party having wealth, and desiring to use it, not for himself, but, as he believes, for God's kingdom, consecrates a portion thereof to secure the teaching of what he conceives to be the divine truth. There are two parties to this transaction, the giver and the receivers. The giver makes his bequest on certain conditions, which are to him matters, doubtless, of conscience and obligation. The receivers accept the gift under the conditions by which it is accompanied; otherwise they would not have it in their power to receive it. The property, therefore, consecrated to the promulgation of certain doctrines deemed to be divine truth, passes into their hands, and they bind themselves so to administer it. This is the first stage.

The second stage is the entrance of teachers upon their functions. These persons accept their position; otherwise they would not be chosen. They engage themselves under this obligation. Therefore they enter upon the enjoyment of the building, rooms, emoluments and the honour attaching to their office. They enter upon the results of the wealth bequeathed by the founder for God's glory and His kingdom. This is the second stage.

The buildings, the appliances, the emoluments, the honours continue to exist as a matter of tangible value and effect through many succeeding years, and after the death of the founder. The question now is: Has any professor the right in this building, under these circumstances and enjoying these emoluments, to do otherwise than carry out the object for which they were founded? If a question arises as to whether any professor is doing this or not, two lines of thought suggest themselves. A professor may claim that his teaching is either technically or for substance in accordance with the intentions of the founder. The ascertainment of this will be a question for enquiry, comparing of documents, hearing of evidence, etc. But he may take another ground altogether, and say he is not bound by the intentions of the founder or the rules of the foundation; that the founder was utterly foolish in attempting to bind him and men like him; that he has a right to teach whatever he conceives to be the truth; that Christian liberty forbids his being bound to do anything else. It is this second ground which I understand THE INDEPENDENT to justify.

*Query:* Is this ground tenable? Respectfully, and with all deference, I submit that it is not. For if it is, then a Roman Catholic professor might claim that what he held was the truth, and that he was bound to teach it as opportunity offered; that the seminary was a suitable place in which to exercise his function of teaching, and that he had a right, once being a

professor (no matter how his professorship was obtained), to teach the doctrines of the Roman Church therein. Or an Agnostic or Freethinker might obviously claim to teach what he conceived to be the truth. Even a Mohammedan pundit, from the schools of Constantinople, might claim that *he* had the truth, and was bound to teach it, and that there was no let or hindrance to his exercising his function there also. So also might a Brahmin, a Buddhist, a disciple of Confucius or Zoroaster. And if it were objected that should all these opinions be resounding through the college a perfect Babel would result, a reply on the principles held by certain persons (see letter to the *Hartford Herald*) would be that such a conflict was the best mode of bringing out and elevating the truth, and that the experiment of having conflicting opinions taught in the same college would certainly result in the truth, as a final residuum, being lodged in the minds of the students. That, therefore, no harm, but good, could come from such a mode of filling up the professors' chairs of the college; and that, in fact, the trustees administering its affairs were bound to take no notice of a man's belief, or non-belief, but simply to consider whether he was a well-educated man, a good scholar and apt to teach.

I have used, it will be observed, a mode of mathematical reasoning which has proved most effectual in the detection of error. The case has been put fairly and squarely on its merits, and the writer will leave the result to the judgment of impartial readers.

Pardon my adding a few words more. 1. That the world abounds with errors is a very trite saying. What is not so often noticed, however, is that in the wide domain of error surrounding it on all sides the path of truth is *narrow*. 2. Truth *binds* both the intellect and the conscience. Where truth comes, liberty is thereby displaced. Finally, as between English Independency and American Congregationalism, the issue has been tried, and the former was found wanting. It was strenuously advocated in Toronto more than thirty years ago by a man, whose abilities placed him on a towering eminence above his fellows, but the results were disastrous. The churches of Canada, therefore, after full experience of both, have long ago been committed to the latter.

Montreal, February 5.

GEORGE HAGUE.

MR. HAGUE in his critique of our jottings of Feb. 1, raises the question whether any professor in a college has a right to violate his trust: and, answering as he only could answer, No, says this is "the ground which I understand THE INDEPENDENT to justify! THE INDEPENDENT justified nothing of the kind. What it did was to deprecate the conceit and the selfishness which seeks to bind future ages by its own narrowness. We are perfectly aware that this is not the question at issue before the Andover visitors.