"In the Supreme Court of Florida the final disposition of causes is made in consultation by all the judges before they are assigned to particular judges for the writing of the opinion, except in cases free from doubt, or those involving new questions. In such cases, a designated judge examines and writes out his conclusions, after which each judge examines for himself before assenting. Every record is severally examined by each judge, so far as necessary to understand the questions presented in the assignment of errors. The judge who is designated to deliver the opinion first examines and makes a statement of the case, which is commonly accepted by the others, in ordinary or not difficult cases. The presiding judge usually assigns the cases to the judges for the writing of opinions, after conference, and upon first impressions; though this is a matter of usage only. * * * *

"In the Supreme Court of Louisiana the disposition of causes is made after consultation, and after the judge to whom the case has been assigned has reported the facts of the case and the points of law at issue. If a majority of the judges concur with him, he writes the opinion; if not, the case is assigned by the chief justice to another justice. Usually, the report is examined by only one of the judges, who reports the facts of the case to his associates in consultation. The presiding judge assigns the cause to the judges for examination and report."

THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

The Boston *Advertiser* directs attention to an incident of the Bradlaugh case before the House of Lords, which we have not seen referred to elsewhere, namely, the fact that a lay peer, Lord Denman, voted with one law lord to affirm the judgment. The *Advertiser* says:—"To act as the Supreme Court of appeal in almost all matters is as proper a function of the House of Lords as the trial of impeachments is in the United States Senate, and for the origin of the former power it is necessary to go back to the days when lawyers were scarce, and when many judges had little or no training in the law, when judicial functions were not separated from legislative, and when the general court was not an inappropriate name by which to call the Legislature. In those times every peer entitled to sit in the House of Lords, whether spiritual or temporal, of whatever age, character, or profession, was entitled to vote upon all questions or law, and exercised his right if his own interest or party spirit called him. Gradually, however, if the matter involved was one of pure law and had no connection with politics, and if public interest was not excited, the custom arose that no lord should vote except those who were peculiarly qualified, as, for instance, peers who were or had been judges. The custom grew in the eighteenth century, although in a half dozen cases or more the lay lords interfered, in matters of election, of ecclesiastical law, the questions involving the descent of a peerage, and in some other cases. Finally, in 1806, in a case involving the right to the guardianship of a child, to use the words of a nobleman then living: 'The House of Lords made a very discreditable appearance, attending in great numbers at the solicitation or command of the Prince of Wales.' From this time forward the scandal ceased, until in 1844 Daniel O'Connell having been convicted of conspiracy, appealed to the House of Lords from the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland. The government of Sir Robert Peel was anxious for his conviction, and the tory majority in the House of Lords was large, but five or six of the law lords were whigs, and, although one was absent and one wished to affirm the judgment appealed from, there was still a majority in favor of O'Connell. Accordingly, when the Lord Chancellor, as Speaker of the House, asked those peers who were in favor of reversing the judgment to say "content," three whig law lords answered, but when he asked those peers who opposed to say "not content," several lay lords responded. The Chancellor did not declare the vote, but in a moment put the question again, with the same result. Then Lord Wharncliffe, the president of the council, speaking on the advice of the Duke of Wellington, urged the lay lords to withhold their votes in order that the character of the House of Lords as a court of appeal might be maintained. After a short discussion, in which it was admitted on all hands that there was nothing but their own sense of fitness of things to restrain lay lords from voting, they followed Lord Wharncliffe's suggestion and withdrew.

"In 1876, by the Judicature Act, for the