

derisory for an international effort under Chapter 7 of the Charter.

International approach

What should be the role of the international community in the Rhodesian crisis? First and foremost, it should recognize that the white rebellion in Rhodesia forms an integral part of the wider struggle going on through Southern Africa. Rhodesia should not be regarded in isolation from the rest of the subcontinent. Next, although it should recognize the limitations of international intervention, it could mobilize its collective power to make sanctions more effective while, at the same time, giving direct support and encouragement to the white and black opponents of the Smith regime. Commonwealth solidarity is one important factor. But the biggest immediate contribution is to give a new lease of life to the UN sanctions program by insisting more rigidly on member states honouring their obligations. (A useful start would be for the United States to rescind its exemptions on Rhodesian chrome and other strategic minerals.) The most important contribution, however, would be to develop a new strategy for enforcing sanctions.

This strategy should start by recognizing that Portugal and South Africa will refuse co-operation in any program of international sanctions. But this is not fatal to its operations. The key to an effective sanctions policy is to deprive the Smith regime of foreign-exchange earnings; this is much more important than denying it imports. It has already lost the benefit of its most important pre-UDI source of foreign-exchange earnings — tobacco. Now it relies almost entirely on the export of minerals, beef and agricultural products. Since the last two sources of income are derived largely from markets within Southern Africa, there is probably little that can be done about this; but they are insignificant compared to the earnings from minerals.

All Rhodesian minerals are sold overseas. Portugal and South African can, therefore, assist the Smith regime only by facilitating the export of its minerals. In today's circumstances, very little can be done to block the shipment of these minerals to the ports of Mozambique and South Africa. The objective, therefore, should be to intercept the embargoed cargoes at their ports of disembarkation. British intelligence has, so far, rendered admirable service in pinpointing precisely what cargoes leave the ports of Mozam-

bique or South Africa. The problems arise at their destinations. The experience in the past has been that, with few exceptions, even when cargoes have been apprehended for inspection, the recipient countries have proved unco-operative.

UN inspection

The need, therefore is to provide for a UN system of inspection of all suspect cargoes and not to leave their identification to authorities of the receiving country. This system can be supervised by a team of UN technical advisers. All cargoes declared black must be confiscated — not just returned to the point of embarkation, as has sometimes happened. If this were to happen, Rhodesia would not only lose the foreign-exchange earnings from its exports but it would suffer serious losses in the cost of mining, transporting and paying sanctions-breakers for their services. It would require the loss of only a relatively small number of such shipments to take the profit out of the trade for sanctions-breaking ships and companies. Without their services, the task of breaching sanction would become increasingly difficult, if not, indeed, impossible.

Finally, if all UN member states can be persuaded to pass and enforce the same kind of legislation as adopted by Britain to prosecute the captains, owners and agents of ships engaged in sanctions-breaking, the operation of sanctions could be made very effective. It is significant that not a single British ship or agent has been known to engage in sanctions-breaking; the penalties have been made too high.

Here, then, is a practical international approach to the question of making the world's first collective attempt at imposing sanctions effective.

For these who believe in the importance of developing some alternative to international military sanctions, the chance of demonstrating the possible efficacy of economic sanctions offers a stirring challenge. But we should not lose sight of the fact that even an effective sanctions program is only one factor in the effort to defeat Rhodesia's Smith regime. We should not be discouraged by the time it takes, or by the near certainty that the going will get rougher in Rhodesia and in Southern Africa. Unfortunately, the distribution of power in the subcontinent makes it unlikely that the situation can be changed in that part of the world by peaceful means alone. Our aim should be to reduce, so far as possible, the loss of life, misery and economic chaos.

*Economic sanctions
only one element
in any effort
to defeat regime*