

inform other people about Canada. It is really the forging of verbal bullets and doodle-bugs to mess up the enemy's lines of communication and production centres.

Precedent to appointment of F.S.O's.<sup>30</sup> and establishing procedure for the flow of papers, I suggest that we try to list some of the main objectives of this attack, have them thoroughly discussed and agreed upon by the Heads of the Political, Economic and Consular Divisions and then draft a tentative opening programme.

This programme would include the use of news broadcasting of the C.B.C. but it should also allow for daily or periodical broadcasts based on a broad plan with long range and short range purposes and written according to clearly defined policy directives drawn up in the Department.

If we took this matter seriously, I think the Heads of Divisions concerned, or selected substitutes, with a continuing responsibility for the work, should meet every, say, Wednesday, and draft the outline of the directive for Thursday and the subsequent week. The executive officer of such a committee could be the F.S.O. appointed to the Information Division to deal jointly with the C.B.C. liaison officer on current news and on the planned Psychological Warfare.

As Gerry Riddell said this morning, this Psychological Warfare is a much more complicated and difficult undertaking than the other. Hence I think it will call for a good deal more preparation before it can be launched. Amongst others, Dunton and [I.R.A.] Dilworth<sup>31</sup> should be closely advised of this development from the beginning.

Speaking generally, I have the feeling that we are just beginning to realize how little conscious manipulation we have made of our foreign policy. I mean by this that while we have of course worked out and recommended a policy on a multitude of problems as they have arisen, we have done little or nothing to apply the general principles behind any one of these special policies to a general end. Some of the public utterances of the Minister and others have embodied in certain well-worn phrases our desire to act collectively in defence of the West, but I do not feel that this underlying principle of action has been much more than a passive element hitherto.

Knowing as little as I do, however, about Departmental policy on the big issues, I should perhaps not go any further on this point. I am chiefly concerned at the moment in shaking out what I regard as the rather muddled collection of ideas with which we were dealing this morning, though I realize that the muddle was mostly in my own mind and partly caused by the in and out policy I had to follow towards the meeting!

T.W.L. M[ACDERMOTT]

<sup>30</sup> Foreign Service Officer.

<sup>31</sup> Directeur général, Radio Canada (Service international).  
General Supervisor, CBC(IS)