Disregarding the philosophical question as to how nervous action is associated with subjective ideation, and concerning ourselves only with the scientific fact that it is thus associated, we may most clearly appreciate the parallel which I am about to draw if we regard the objective processes as the causes of the subjective. Whether or not such is really the case matters nothing to the exposition on which I am about to enter; for I throughout take it for granted that the association of neurosis and psychosis is as invariable and precise as it would be were it proved to be due to a relation of causality. Placing therefore neurosis for the purposes of my argument as the cause of psychosis, I desire to show that there is a very exact parallel between the ganglionic action which produces subjective ideation and that which produces muscular co-ordination; I desire to show that if we interpret the phenomena of ideation in terms of the nervous activity which is supposed to produce it, we shall find that this activity is just the same in all its laws and principles as that which produces muscular co-ordination.

No doubt it sounds absurd, and from a philosophical point of view alone it is absurd, to speak of ideas as the psychological equivalents of muscles. So far as subjective analysis could teach us, it certainly does not seem that an idea presents any further kinship to a muscle than it does to a stone, or to the moon; but when we look at the matter from the objective side, we perceive that the kinship is most intimate. Taking it for granted that the same idea is only and always aroused during the activity of the same nervous structure, element, or group of cells and fibres, it follows that any particular mental change resembles any particular muscular contraction in so far as it is the terminal result of the activity of a particular nervous structure. The incongruity of comparing a mental change to a muscular contraction arises, of course, from the emphatic distinction which must always be felt to exist between mental and dynamical processes. Physiology, which is concerned only with the dynamical processes, can take no cognizance of anything that happens in the region of mind. It can trace nervous action leading to combined muscular movements of greater and greater intricacy as we ascend to more and more elaborated mechanisms; but even when we reach the brain of man, physiology can have nothing to do with the mental side of