

XI.

THE USE OF FLEETS TO INTERPRET A TREATY.

Under the misunderstandings of the past we have on both sides sent fleets to these waters to protect our fishermen against each other, and against the unfriendly conduct of the local governments; fleets to enforce agreements that the governments concerned could not expound by a mutual understanding.

If these questions are left open, and commercial war is inaugurated through measures of retaliation, how many ships and guns is it supposed will be needed to keep the peace between our fishermen on the coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland?

The danger in this direction does not come from the desire of either Government to promote a war, but from their inability to prevent its initiation through the personal hostilities of men associated in the use of common rights and privileges, and stimulated by rivalries which are encouraged by laws of retaliation enacted by their respective Governments.

These are some of the dangers against which this treaty wisely makes safe provision.

XII.

THE AREA YIELDED BY THE DELIMITATIONS OF THIS TREATY, AS COMPARED WITH THOSE YIELDED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON THEIR CONSTRUCTION OF THE LIMITS OF OUR "RENUNCIATION" UNDER THE TREATY OF 1818.

It is alleged by some that this treaty yields to the British Government 50,000 square miles of exclusive fishing-grounds beyond what we yielded in the treaty of 1818.

Taking the contention of the United States that no headland theory is to be found in the treaty of 1818, and that the exclusive fishing limit is a line 3 miles from the shore, at low water, that enters all harbors, bays, and creeks that are more than 6 miles wide at the entrance, and follows the sinuosities of the coast thereof, this estimate of the area surrendered in this treaty is greatly exaggerated.

This is the narrowest limit to which we have confined our renunciation in the treaty of 1818, of the common right of fishery, in our contentions with Great Britain.