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of the collective decision which is arrived at, assume some role in implementing that decision. That is why we are in NATO. If we are then asked to test the guidance system of the Cruise missile, I feel that we should do so. That was not ever raised as part of the discussion in 1979. There were no assignments handed out. All we knew was which countries would deploy the missiles on their own territory.

I am sorry, there was a second question which the Hon. Member asked.

Mr. Allmand: Yes, Mr. Speaker, does the Hon. Member think that it is necessary, under the 1979 agreement, that we do in fact develop a missile such as the Cruise when we already have overwhelming fire power that could destroy the East?

Miss MacDonald: Mr. Speaker, I tried to express the very real feeling of vulnerability that was conveyed at that December, 1979, meeting that the population of these countries in western Europe have because they have nothing to counter the SS-20. These people have lived through two world wars. But they have seen thousands of citizens of their countries die. They do not want to be overwhelmed again. They want something in the way of a deterrent, and the only thing they have in the way of a deterrent to the SS-20 at the present time is the American inter-continental ballistic missile system. That is where their defence lies, and they articulated that they are not at all sure that they can count on it.

If there is a strike made against them by the Soviet Union, they are not at all sure that the United States will automatically put itself into that battle. That is why these people say, "We want to be sure that we have some defensive mechanism to protect ourselves." As long as the people of the countries of western Europe feel that way, then I feel that we as a member of NATO supporting them must agree to that kind of defensive system which, in this case, means the Cruise missile and the Pershing II.

Mr. Garnet M. Bloomfield (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of National Revenue): Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to comment on a subject that has received a great deal of attention lately, and that is the testing of the Cruise missile in Canada. As all Hon. Members know, on February 10, 1983, Canada and the United States signed a five-year umbrella weapons testing agreement which established general ground rules for the testing of some of the U.S. military equipment and defence systems in Canada. At a later date, negotiators from both countries will try to establish a precise framework for the testing of different weapons, including the air-launched version of the Cruise missile in Alberta. However, to date no specific arrangement has been made to test Cruise missiles in Canada.

At the heart of the recent controversy is the Cruise missile itself, a missile which is basically a small, pilotless vehicle capable of delivering a nuclear warhead with great accuracy over long distances. It is too slow to be counted as a first strike weapon, but its accuracy and difficulty of detection makes it a devastating weapon. The Cruise missile is really the now generation of the V-1 rocket the Germans developed near the

end of the Second World War that wrought such havoc on old London. The Cruise missile is very similar to that rocket except that it has wings and a guidance system. The Americans are not the only ones to have a Cruise missile. The Soviets, the French and the British also have similar vehicles, but only the Americans have developed the missile to such a high degree.

The U.S. is currently working on half a dozen different types of the Cruise missile. Most versions are being developed by the United States Navy and can be launched from submarines, surface ships or, in the case of the European version, by land. The other major type of Cruise is designed to be launched by B-52 bombers. This is the only type of Cruise that is presently being considered for operational testing in Canada.

The Cruise missiles have interchangeable roles. Almost every type of Cruise can be converted from nuclear to conventional warheads in relatively short order. They can also be outfitted to perform electronic warfare or surveillance roles. By making trade-offs with weapon payload, speed and fuel volume, the range of a Cruise can be extended from 370 miles to 1,500 miles without changing the missile's basic design.

Since Canada has foresworn the use of nuclear weapons on its own soil, it is already understood that none of the U.S. tests will involve nuclear warheads, nor will Canada be expected to deploy any of the missiles. The United States is expected to bear all testing costs. Also, there is a provision in the umbrella agreement which gives both countries the right to cancel or suspend any specific test. This gives us a great deal of control over the actual testing of weapons in Canada.

I think it is very important for Canadians to realize that we fully support NATO and the alliance. We believe that a credible deterrent is needed to maintain peace with liberty. That is why we supported NATO in 1979 when it adopted the "talk and deploy" or the two-track strategy. This strategy allows the western world to actively engage in negotiations that could contribute to meaningful and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements, while at the same time to work with our allies to modernize our theatre and conventional defence forces in Europe so that they will in fact form a deterrent to the frightening build-up of Soviet armaments.

The military strategy of NATO, the strategy of flexible response, serves to preserve military security. Its aim is to prevent war through deterrence. Deterrence is effective when the allies are able to make credible their capability and willingness to defend themselves against any conceivable attack and can make the risk of attack unacceptable for a potential aggressor.

NATO is only capable of deterrence and defence through the close political and strategic co-ordination between North America and western Europe. Intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear forces in Europe and conventional forces are required as deterrents for the entire spectrum of possible armed conflicts. NATO holds nuclear weapons at the ready not because it wants to wage a nuclear war, but rather because it wants to prevent war. The destructive power of