

Distinguished Guests:

It is an honour for me to attend this colloquium and to speak to you this evening.

I would like to begin by offering a warm welcome to the experts who are joining in these discussions. You come from seven countries of the North Pacific, the United States, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Soviet Union, the Republic of Korea and Canada, and from some other interested countries, Australia, Malaysia, Mongolia and the United Kingdom. And, on behalf of all of us, I compliment York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies for organizing this colloquium, and specifically thank Professors David Dewitt and Paul Evans for their effective efforts in bringing together so many distinguished experts.

I trust also that the North Pacific government observers whom I am pleased to see here will find the next days' discussions both informative and helpful to their own considerations of the issues at hand.

The Canadian government has been pleased to contribute funding for this meeting as a sign of the importance we attach to what will take place here. This reflects a long-term commitment by the Government of Canada to the process you are beginning, a commitment that will continue in support of the process of research and discussion in the coming year.

I first broached the idea of a North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue last July in speeches here in Victoria, in Tokyo, and in Jakarta. That was against a background of historic global change, change that could not help but have significant effects both on global and regional peace and security and on the conduct of international relations. I believe that this factor -- this historic change -- looms as large today as it did then.

The world keeps changing and there is now less euphoria about the results than there was a year ago. But there have been quantum changes -- fundamentally in the role of the superpowers but also in the attitudes of developing countries who sense themselves more likely to be isolated and among developed countries who must weigh the costs of all concepts of security against the benefits of new means of co-operation. But if the euphoria has changed, the fact has not. Our world is significantly different in 1991 from what it was five years ago. This is most evident in Europe and in the Soviet Union so far, but the effects are global.