

where the nuclear option is publicly decried rather than acclaimed; however, such evolution is difficult to predict, and even more difficult to influence.

International pressures and encouragement is also a complex subject. We have seen that India in particular is not susceptible to being cajoled by powers that it sees as in any case hypocritical on nuclear matters. And a package meant to show the concrete advantages offered by the international community for good behaviour on the part of India would have to be so large and impressive in order to have any significant effect that it can be considered a real challenge to design, much less implement. All of this is very different from a Latin America keen to be re-integrated into the Western community and desperate for technical assistance, debt relief, access to markets and the like.

CONCLUSION

The above suggests caution and modesty where moves towards resolution of the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry are concerned. There are limited if often interesting lessons one can draw from the South American experience in this field. But their limitations seem often to dwarf their utility. The differences are so vast as to be daunting in the extreme. Those differences involve chiefly, as we have seen, the role of the international community and especially the United States and Europe, the utility of democracy as a spur to reason on these issues, the prospects for regional economic integration as a rubric for discussions of the advantages of cooperation replacing confrontation, the place of geopolitical, nationalist and military thought, and the simple level of threat perception in place.

In the Latin American case bureaucracies and scientific communities doubtless directly involved had a role in keeping the nuclear issue alive. But this is easily exaggerated. During the long years of military dictatorship it was not they but the military bureaucracy itself, embedded in government at every level, which worked to push forward interest in a nuclear option. Its lack of more permanent clout became clear later on as the very slight likelihood of Latin American nuclear programmes surviving the return of democracy combined with financially stringent circumstances showed itself. In South Asia, state and scientific bureaucracies played a greater role and were in fact the focus for such debates as there were at a variety of stages.

What we have found is that a large number of significant factors added up to the possibility for recently returned civilian regimes to opt to abandon nuclear programmes that had only in a small way captured the imagination of those countries' public opinion. A crisis atmosphere joined hopes for the future engendered by the opportunities for economic growth and renewed prosperity to bring about an end to those programmes in the context of vastly changed foreign and defence policy in Argentina, with the result that Brazil could follow the lead and reduce its threat perception as well.