

its launcher ratios. However, the question that will arise still concerns ICBM vulnerability. In the force structures posited in Tables 5 and 7, the 500 US ICBM launchers are likely to be considered highly vulnerable to the 3600 Soviet warheads on the counter-force capable SS-18s and 19s. This issue is addressed in Table 6.

- (2) To maintain the SLBM warhead total close to 50%, as indicated in the reduction section of Table 5, a trade-off between ICBMs and strategic bombers is required. The difficulty with this trade-off is that the large numbers of warheads per strategic bomber cannot be reduced without a change in the accepted counting rules, for there is no obvious way to confirm that a bomber capable of carrying 24 or more warheads will henceforth carry only (say) 20.²⁹ On the other hand, if

Table 5

<u>US Forces (without LRINF)</u>			
<u>Launchers</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Warheads</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
ICBM 1024	51%	2124	18%
SLBM 648	32%	5760	50%
Bombers 324	16%	3642	32%
<u>1996</u>		<u>11,526</u>	
<u>US Present Forces Without LRINF</u>			
(6,000 warhead ceiling, 50% launcher reduction)			
<u>Launcher ceiling 998</u>		<u>Warhead ceiling 6,000</u>	
225 Minuteman II (1 warhead)		225	
275 Minuteman III (3 warheads)		825	
Mark 12A		(1050)(18%)	
192 Poseidon C-3 (10 warheads)		1920	
144 Trident C-4 (8 warheads)		1152	
		(3072)(51%)	
<u>100 Bombers</u>		<u>(1878)(31%)</u>	
936		6000	

²⁹ Under the SALT II counting rules, 20 was the agreed number of ALCMs per bomber, but there was no rule for counting the number of gravity bombs