

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

At the same time, we must always bear in mind the basic understanding that what are to be declared and eliminated are those chemicals defined as weapons according to the general-purpose criteria, related weapon systems and their production facilities. If we lose sight of this basic point, the scope of the definition is likely to expand beyond control, leading us into a dangerous vicious circle in treaty language.

I should like to mention here that in looking for suitable verification technology to monitor chemical-weapons related facilities, especially facilities for elimination, it would be relevant to consider the application of what the IAEA utilizes as a reliable remote sensor technology in the implementation of safeguards. This is known as RECOVER, and I would like to present a working paper in due course introducing an example of this technology as applied to verification of a chemical weapons convention.

Allow me next to turn to permitted activities. The two major activities foreseen in this regard are those for protective purposes and peaceful purposes.

With regard to protective purposes, Japan is able to support the following two points, namely: that the production of super-toxic lethal and related chemicals for protective purposes should take place in a single specialized facility and in no case should the gross total of such chemicals exceed one ton: and that this specialized facility should be submitted to routine international on-site verification.

As regards peaceful purposes, such as industrial, agricultural, research, medical and other activities, language should be elaborated which takes due account of the guiding principle already agreed to previously, namely that States Parties to this convention undertake not to create any impediments to such peaceful activities.

There have been a number of proposals regarding the effective monitoring of the production and other related activities with regard to specific chemicals which might possibly hinder the attainment of the objectives of the convention. These measures are important means to enhance confidence amongst the States Parties in the implementation of the convention. The basic approach which Japan supports with regard to this is as follows. First, specific chemicals to be put on the list of material to be so monitored should be defined as clearly as possible by giving the exact scientific name and, where necessary, the chemical formula. Second, the number of chemicals to be included in such a list should be kept to the bare minimum, but the list should be subjected to periodic review after the entry into force of the convention. Third, the list should start with super-toxic lethal chemicals used exclusively for weapons purposes, and go on to their immediate precursors which have little peaceful applications. I realize that whether we can agree to the above as the criteria to define a key precursor is something to be elaborated through future negotiations.

With respect to precursors other than those mentioned above and the so-called dual purpose substances, a great deal of care is required in their identification and listing because many of them are widely produced and used for peaceful purposes. It would seem extremely difficult to determine clearly and objectively whether a given chemical in this category was intended for peaceful purposes or for military purposes, whereas given our free market economy, we would be unable to accept undue restrictions on normal industrial production. This fact must always be borne in mind in all considerations to include these chemicals in the list and place them under some kind of control.