

required to invite observers to military activities regarded as alert exercises, for which the troops themselves have not received prior notice, unless these activities are of greater than seventy-two hours duration.

4) *Annual Calendars*: Every year signatories must exchange, no later than 15 November, calendars of their military activities that are subject to prior notification. The calendars must include such information as the size of the planned activity, the type of troops involved, and the location and purpose of the activity.

5) *Constraining Provisions*: Notice for military activities involving over 40,000 troops and over 75,000 troops must be given one and two years in advance, respectively. Unnotified activities should be kept to as few as possible.

6) *Compliance and Verification*: The agreed measures for verifying compliance with the Stockholm Agreement were of historic significance. For the first time ever, military activities which may not comply with the Agreement are subject to challenge, on-site inspections. No State is required to accept more than three such inspections per calendar year, and not more than one from the same inspecting nation, but it is understood that participating States belonging to the same military alliance will not take advantage of this provision. Both ground and aerial inspections are allowed, with the inspecting nation specifying the flight-path of the aircraft, and the aircraft itself chosen by mutual consent. Inspection teams must be allowed into the territory of the inspected State within thirty-six hours of the request. The inspection must last no longer than forty-eight hours. Some provisions allow certain sensitive areas to be exempt from inspection, but these are carefully circumscribed.

It is generally acknowledged that the Stockholm Agreement largely fulfilled the Madrid Mandate to produce more politically and militarily significant CBMs. Militarily, the agreed measures strengthened the document substantially over the Helsinki Accords. The level of transparency among the participants was raised through the mandatory use of observers, calendars, and notifications. Constraining provisions, though limited, were introduced into the European CBM regime. Most noteworthy, however, were the measures adopted to verify compliance with the Agreement. The intrusiveness and quick response involved in implementing these verification measures were meant to dissuade irregular use of military forces. Overall, there is evidence to suggest that the Agreement has encouraged participating military planners to assess their plans in light of the requirements laid down in Stockholm.

Politically, the Agreement is far more binding than were the Helsinki Accords; the language used is stronger and the terms better defined. It represents the first time that the Eastern bloc has accepted the concept of on-site inspection.⁸ This acceptance was crucial if the Agreement were to be substantive.⁹

However, criticism has been levelled at the Stockholm Agreement, particularly in regard to its military significance. Analysts have stated that its provisions are too limited; the Agreement cannot effectively restrict the use of military force.¹⁰ They cite drawbacks such as: the ability to conduct alert exercises and mobilization activities without notice; the limited constraints on very large exercises; and the small number of inspections permitted for each State.

Compliance with the Helsinki Confidence-Building Measures

The Helsinki CBMs were, in general, adhered to by the CSCE participants. In the eleven years during which the Helsinki CBMs were in force, only one formal complaint was made. The record of compliance shows that the implementation of the Helsinki Accords was very much a political exercise, subject to the changing East-West climate of the 1975-1986 period.

Table I shows that a total of 130 exercises were notified between 1975 and 1986.¹¹ The majority of these — seventy-four — were mandatory notifications of major exercises as agreed in Helsinki. The remaining fifty-six consisted of voluntary notification of smaller exercises. Observers were invited to forty-six major and twenty smaller manoeuvres. Table I shows that NATO countries notified more of their smaller exercises, and invited more observers to monitor them, than did the Warsaw Pact countries. The record of the Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) countries compares favorably with that of NATO. This pattern reveals a greater propensity on the part of NATO and the NNA to go beyond the letter of the Final Act.

Table I: Exercises Notified Under the Helsinki Final Act 1975-86

	Major Exercises (> 25 000)	Smaller Exercises (< 25 000)	Total
NATO			
notified	37	38	75
observers invited	31	15	46
Warsaw Pact			
notified	27	7	34
observers invited	8	1	9
NNA			
notified	10	11	21
observers invited	7	4	11
Subtotals			
notified	74	56	130
observers invited	46	20	66
Note :	NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization WP = Warsaw Pact NNA = Neutral and Non-Aligned.		