

officers (shared by colleagues in the other services) that Soviet compliance with such an agreement could be adequately monitored without cooperative provisions." Furthermore, they go on to say that, if necessary for American domestic political reasons or to protect information about US intelligence capabilities, "cooperative technical means" could be "devised for verifying compliance without constraining surface vessels or submarines other than SSBNs [their prohibition would extend only to the latter], and which would not increase SSBN vulnerability in peace or war."¹⁵⁵

Vick and Thomson are somewhat less sanguine about the possibilities of verifying such an accord. While agreeing that "the United States is certainly capable of building an elaborate detection system off its coasts to police such a zone," they express the fear that "most of our current ASW assets would have to be devoted to the patrol of this zone," while "we could [not] be . . . confident that a few SSBNs would not slip into" it.¹⁵⁶ While the latter point seems reasonable, the former appears less so: the United States and its allies, as well as the Soviet Union, for that matter, already maintain elaborate sensor systems to detect the approach of enemy submarines close to their shores; the need to monitor an explicit prohibition on the latter may impel the further development of such systems, with a variety of beneficial results, but it seems a gross exaggeration to suppose that the entire US ASW force, worldwide, would have to be devoted to this task.

A number of other possible objections have been raised in the still scant literature on the subject of forward-deployment restrictions. For example, there is the problem shared with so many similar types of CBMs, unlike the case with arms control measures affecting force-levels, that they could be violated on short notice. Richard Betts warns that "if the withdrawals had been negotiated and were violated, the repositioning of the weapons would make matters worse than if no agreement had existed."¹⁵⁷ The same can be said of

155. Ball *et al.*, *op. cit.* note 142, p. 84.

156. Vick and Thomson, *op. cit.* note 135, p. 122.

157. Betts, *op. cit.* note 141, p. 72.