

of the United States we are interested not less but probably more than the United States in reliable verification, in adequate concrete measures of arms limitation and disarmament".

The Soviet Union has made recently many far-reaching proposals on the verification problems concerning compliance with various arms limitation agreements. As an example let us take the negotiations on a chemical-weapon ban. During those negotiations we propose agreement on a whole range of different verification methods. These include national control, control with the employment of different national technical means, based on the latest scientific achievements, mandatory systematic or permanent international on-site verification, and finally the "challenge" inspections. Of course, the selection of any particular verification method is entirely determined by the goals of the chemical-weapon ban which it is intended to further. There is no universal system of control: each verification method must be linked to a specific activity prohibited or permitted under the convention. We have no unjustified leaning in favour of any single verification method, and we do not play with verification in order in fact to block the negotiations. The complex approach of the USSR to the questions of verification of a chemical-weapon ban completely ensures, we are deeply convinced, the effective implementation of the future convention.

Experience of international negotiations confirms that the basis for the solution of verification problems always consists in whether or not different sides taking part in the negotiations have the political will to conclude an appropriate agreement. In spite of the great difficulties connected with the solution of complex verification problems, including technological problems, it turned out to be possible to conclude, for example, the strategic arms limitation treaties between the USSR and the United States, as well as the agreements on the limitation of underground tests of nuclear weapons, on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the whole set of multilateral international agreements containing the relevant provisions on verification.

"I wish to emphasize most firmly" stated A.A. Gromyko at a press conference on 2 April 1983 -- that for the Soviet Union verification has never been a stumbling block for the implementation of agreements or negotiations in the course of agreements, though we have heard from the other side a great deal of demagogy on that score, particularly away from the negotiating table.

However, verification is impossible without appropriate agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. Just as disarmament is hardly probable without control, likewise there cannot be control without disarmament. It cannot be considered feasible, on the one hand, to block the elaboration of appropriate agreements in the field of disarmament, oppose negotiations and block appropriate mandates for subsidiary bodies, and, on the other, achieve agreements on verification measures.

The course pursued by the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of a nuclear-weapon-test ban can serve as an example of such a distorted approach to the verification problem. These countries continue to block negotiations aimed at achieving an agreement on a nuclear-test ban, while insisting at the same time on the continuation of the discussion of verification.

They tell us that the time for negotiations has not come, not everything is clear in the field of verification. We decisively disagree with this manner of approaching the question. We are convinced, and this is confirmed by many reports from various sources, including United States ones, that behind it there are plans for expanded nuclear-weapon testing with a view to the development of new types of nuclear arms. In our opinion all problems of verification, without exception, could be solved during appropriate negotiations if all sides display political will to achieve an agreement. In order to show once again our goodwill, the Soviet delegation would like today to state the following.

In the event that the mandate of the Conference's subsidiary body on a nuclear-test