


## CONTENTS OF No. 31, VOL. X.

POETRY:—	
Church Bells.....	370
EDITORIAL:—	
Our Commercial Marine.....	363
Canadian Team at Wimbledon.....	367
Mobilization of British Army.....	367
The Turko-Selavonic War.....	367
Ocean Yacht Race.....	368
Canadian Relativatory Measures.....	369
News of the Week.....	361
RIFLE COMPETITION:—	
Canadian Team at Wimbledon.....	361
Canadian Team at Albur.....	270
Prince of Wales' Rifles, Montreal.....	370
11th Match, British Columbia.....	371
Shooting at Bedford, N.S.....	371
Major Galt's Battery of Artillery.....	371
Competition for International Team.....	372
SELECTIONS:—	
France's Second Empire.....	362
The Ocean Yacht Race.....	362
The Indian War.....	363, 365
Our Volunteers—Montreal.....	363
The Montenegrians and their Country.....	361
The Abyssinian War.....	369
Bottoms of the Oceans.....	370
Wood of the Duke of Wellington.....	372
REVIEWS.....	372



## The Volunteer Review,

AND

## MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,  
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1876.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as communications intended for publication, must invariably be pre-paid. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and the other the words "Printer's Copy," written and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed hereon will pay the postage. No communication, however, will be inserted unless the writer's name is given, not necessarily for publication, but that we may know from whom it is sent.

We have for the past nine years endeavored to furnish the Volunteer Force of Canada with a paper worthy of their support, but, we regret to say, have not met with that tangible encouragement which we confidently expected when we undertook the publication of a paper wholly devoted to their interests. We now appeal to their chivalry and ask each of our subscribers to procure another, or to a person sending us the names of four or five new subscribers and the money will be entitled to receive one copy for the year *terce*. A little exertion on the part of our friends would materially assist us, besides extending the usefulness of the paper among the Force—keeping them thoroughly posted in all the changes and improvements in the art of war so essential for a military man to know. Our ambition is to improve the *Volunteer Review* in every respect, so as to make it second to none. Will our friends help us to do it? Premiums will be given to those getting up the largest lists. The *Review* being the only military paper published in Canada, it ought to be liberally supported by the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of each Battalion.

A FRAZEE accident attended with loss of life occurred on board the *Thunderer* on the 14th July.

This vessel, one of the most powerful of the British Navy, was engaged in preparing for a trial trip when one of her boilers exploded killing over twenty persons and

wounding more than double that number, a proportion of casualties which might be expected in a hard fought engagement.

The modernized British fleet is in presence of serious disadvantages as compared with its predecessor, inasmuch as its propelling power is a more destructive agent, and the slightest carelessness in dealing with it is sure to be attended with disastrous consequences.

If such an accident had happened in the midst of an action it would totally disable the vessel, the need therefore for directing the attention formerly bestowed on seamanship on the mechanical corps of stokers and engine-drivers is apparent, and has led to that neglect of naval training which has furnished Mr. J. Ruskin with material for the following sarcastic illustration, in a letter to the editor of *Fraser's Magazine*, on "modern warfare":—

"It is true that the ingenuity of our inventors is far from being exhausted, and that in a few years more we may be able to destroy a regiment round a corner and bombard a fleet over the horizon; but I believe the effective result of these crowning scientific successes will only be to confirm the at present partial impression on the minds of military and naval officers, that their duty is rather to take care of their weapons than to use them. 'England will expect' of her generals and admirals to maintain a dignified moral position as far as possible out of the enemy's sight; and in a perfectly scientific era of seamanship we shall see two adverse fleets affected by a constant law of mutual repulsion at distances of 200 or 300 miles."

A contemporary moved by the same spirit gets off the following:—

"The boiler explosion on the British iron plate turret ship *Thunderer*, July 14, off Portsmouth, England, by which twenty persons were killed and sixty wounded, will revive the distrust entertained in England regarding the efficiency of the navy. The disabled vessel is one of the four great steamers which form the "first class" of the British ironclad fleet. She carries four 35 ton guns, weighs 9 157 tons, and has space for 1,600 tons of coal. She is, accordingly, of greater account than the *Vanguard* the loss of which made the English people fear that their naval officers and sailors lacked ability to manage ironclads of the proportions which modern warfare demands. September 7, 1870, the *Captain* with 500 officers and men foundered in a gale off Cape Finisterre. July 1, 1871, the *Agincourt* struck on the Pearl Rock off Gibraltar. July 8, 1871, the *Caledonia* ran aground at Santorin in the Greek Archipelago. December 25, 1872, the *Northumberland* collided with the *Hercules*. September 1, 1875, the *Iron Duke* rammed the *Vanguard* and sent her to the bottom. November 20, 1875, the *Iron Duke* came near sinking by the giving way of the spring of the sluice valve. November 28, 1875, the *Monarch* collided with a Norwegian off the Start Point."

With the exception of this melancholy disaster to the *Thunderer* all the others enumerated could have been avoided by that seamanship which "the irresistible logic of facts" compels us reluctantly to believe is wanting.

A full account of this disaster appeared in the columns of the *Naval and Military Gazette*

which we have reprinted in another column, a perusal of which will give some idea of its character. It is reported that it was caused by the valves being wedged down while the boilers were subjected to test by hydraulic pressure and the contractors forgot to remove the wedges, but such a story is hardly probable, as the steam guage must have given indications of the extreme pressure long before the accident occurred.

The matter will no doubt be thoroughly investigated, but it cannot fail to create great uneasiness respecting the efficiency of the ironclad fleet.

"Since the civil war in America, says the *Army and Navy Gazette*, there have been no opportunities of testing the capabilities of land fortifications for withstanding a serious attack by modern ironclads. The Franco-German war, rich as it was in lessons and experiences of land warfare, did not furnish any instances of combats between floating and fixed batteries, and the question of the superiority of one over the other in the present days of thick armour and heavy guns has yet to be settled. The opinion prevails among military minds in Germany that well appointed land fortifications would bear off the palm in the event of a duel with vessels of war. They argue that even under the most favorable circumstances, and in a calm sea shots from ships afloat could not hit a target two yards in extent twice running, even at a distance of only two or three hundred yards. True shots, indeed, are a matter of chance, while the guns of the coast batteries, well served, could not fail to be more fruitful of results. One great advantage which forts have over ships, they say, is the fact that one telling shot from on shore may put a vessel and all its guns *hors de combat*, while a fixed battery would not be put out of the fight by one single shot, however telling. The ships would also have to count with another enemy, whose destructive capacity has yet to be learnt, viz: the modern torpedo."

This above paragraph seems to be founded on the idea that a ship attacking a fixed battery on shore must be necessarily at an anchor or bow to, while it is evident that the tactics which will be followed would keep her in constant motion, either describing a great circle or such other manoeuvre as would enable her to enfilade the different faces of the opposing shore batteries and fire her guns as they were brought to bear; moreover she has the advantage of choosing her own position, the fixed battery is stationary, and the accuracy of fire attained by properly trained naval artillery is quite as good as that attained by artillery soldiers in fixed batteries. It is the assumption, without the slightest fact to support it, that such is not the case, which has allowed the Woolwich Artillery School to provide guns for the British Navy; and it is in this direction our principal difficulty will be in case of war.

A man at six hundred yards is no better object to fire at than a quart bottle would be at one hundred yards—taking the *Decastation* as the largest ironclad afloat, the range for close action at three thousand yards it would be no very difficult problem to show that she would present an object less than two