

official conduct and character; that the right to so speak of the latter incidentally includes the same liberty as to the former. It is not denied that the right goes to the extent of free and full comment and criticism on the official conduct of a public officer, and there are some cases which maintain the doctrine as broadly as claimed. These cases declare that one who offers his services to the public as an officer thereby surrenders his private character to the public, and is deemed to consent to any imputation, however false and defamatory, if made in good faith. We do not think the doctrine either sound or wholesome. In our opinion, a person who enters upon a public office, or becomes a candidate for one, no more surrenders to the public his private character than he does his private property. Remedy by due course of law, for injury to each, is secured by the same constitutional guaranty, and the one is no less inviolate than the other. To hold otherwise would, in our judgment, drive reputable men from public positions, and fill their places with others having no regard for their reputation; and thus defeat the purpose of the rule contended for, and overturn the reason upon which it is sought to sustain it. That rule has not been generally adopted in this country (*Hamilton v. Eno*, 81 N.Y. 116; *Lewis v. Few*, 5 Johns. 1; *Curtis v. Mussey*, 6 Gray, 261; *Barry v. Moore*, 87 Penn. St. 385; *Kimball v. Fernandez*, 41 Wis. 329; *Sweeney v. Baker*, 13 W. Va. 148; *Com. v. Wardwell*, 136 Mass. 164; *Negley v. Farrow*, 60 Md. 158; *State v. Schmitt*, 49 N.J. Law, 579; *Rearick v. Wilcox*, 81 Ill. 77), and the converse of it has hitherto obtained in this State. *Seeley v. Blair*, Wright (Ohio), 358, 683. Ohio Sup. Ct., Jan. 31st, 1893. *Post Pub. Co. v. Moloney*. Opinion by Williams, J.—*Albany Law Journal*.

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