

## A will to end hostility

ise was that Kashmir was a symptom, not the cause of Indo-Pakistan conflict. The conflict was the result of historical and cultural conditions and interests that preceded Kashmir. Unless these causes were understood and settled, Indian concessions to resolve the Kashmir controversy would induce demands for further concessions on other issues in the future.

A fourth Indian aim was to defeat foreign intrigues which were calculated to contain Indian power. Here the premise was that the creation of Pakistan itself was the result of British intrigue; and Pakistan's hand in Kashmir and in Indo-Pakistan affairs was being strengthened by the USA after 1949. Finally, India sought a meeting of minds between Indians and Pakistanis so that a bilateral dialogue could emerge and the growth of peace thinking in the two countries could pave the way to eventual *reciprocal concessions* in the future.

### New elements

Today the Indo-Pakistan normalization process is still driven by these elements in Indian thinking and by a number of changed circumstances and developments at the international, regional and domestic levels which affect Indo-Pakistan affairs. I shall deal with four of them.

1. Indian conceptions of an Indocentric regional order crystallized after the 1962 debacle and especially after Nehru's death. Nehru ran Indian foreign policy as a one-man show. His approach to unilateral concession to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue was vulnerable to internal political vetoes, especially from the Indian right. Since Nehru died, a national consensus on foreign and military affairs has taken shape and it has accommodated the views of the Indian right. Such a consensus is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for Indo-Pakistan negotiations. As India's strength has demonstrably grown, Indian elites are better able to consider accommodating Pakistani concerns.

2. Since 1971 Pakistan has gradually abandoned the military option to wrest Kashmir by force and to equal India militarily. This is a sea change in the Pakistan government's policy and Pakistani experts continue to urge more re-thinking in Pakistan along these lines. The 1948 Kashmir campaign was launched by M.A. Jinnah in the belief that military force and Western diplomatic pressure could change the Kashmir status quo. The move failed but Pakistani elites learned nothing positive from the experience. On the contrary, the lesson was that "next time" the military option would succeed. The Ayub Khan/Z.A. Bhutto approach in 1965 led to another attempt to change the situation by force. It too failed. It dented Pakistani self-confidence because Indian Prime Minister L.B. Shastri changed Indian military behavior by ordering Indian forces to attack Pakistan so as to relieve the pressure on Kashmir. But 1965 was also seen as a draw by Pakistanis, and their faith in the military option and the prospect of Hindu defeat remained alive. In 1971 Pakistan again exercised the military option against East Pakistani Bengalis and it took the 1971 war to change their faith in the military option. It had taken three wars to change Pakistani thinking. Now fear of future punishment induced caution.

### Cooler superpowers

3. The relations among the great powers have relaxed into détente, a non-interventionist mode with a reluctance to expand their presence in South Asia. (The exception was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.) This pattern emerged after 1965,



the last time the superpowers tried their hand at concerted action to keep Indo-Pakistan peace. Furthermore, since the 1970s there has been a reluctance on the part of USA, USSR and China to take on regional powers such as India, Iran, Israel, Vietnam and South Africa. Partly this reflects the international trend of US-Soviet, Sino-Soviet and Sino-US normalization activities. Partly it reflects a recognition by China that if it is seen as exerting military pressure on the subcontinent, countervailing action by the other powers is likely, as in the 1962 India-China fight. Partly there is a belated recognition by US elites that they can arm Pakistan but they cannot balance India because it has other outside help. Finally, there is a sense that South Asia and the Indian Ocean are peripheral to international security concerns which center on Europe and the Northeast Asia/Pacific zone. The changed international and regional context means that international rivalries and pressures have a minimal role in South Asia and South Asia is less integrated into East-West relations (except on the Afghanistan issue). There is also a greater acceptance of the regional reality of India's ascendancy over Pakistan.

4. The fear (except by Pakistan) of India's fragmentation into small South Asian states reveals a convergence of interests and thinking among India and its smaller neighbors. This fear is parallel to their concern about Indian insensitivity about small states' interests in the region. The common ground here is that if India breaks up, the future of Sri Lanka and Nepal would be bleak. This fear was the point of convergence between India and Sri Lanka in the 1987 Accords and the peacekeeping mission.