

CONCLUSIONS.

1. The anti-German feeling which my first two reports registered has been increased by the German difficulties in Russia and the hope of Allied successes in Africa.
2. The elements in favour of collaboration with Germany find their policy very shaken in present circumstances, and a few of them are trying to retreat.
3. The pressure which the Germans can bring to bear on the French Government should not be underestimated when it directly affects the lives of the French prisoners in Germany and the French population.
4. Measures should be taken to forestall any German move in French North Africa by establishing contacts with the French military authorities on the spot who are very anti-German.
5. When our forces reach the Tunisian frontier conversations will become possible for a renewal of collaboration, military or otherwise, between the French and the Allies, but preliminary contacts should be made well in advance. These contacts should, however, not be made unless we are in a position to send war supplies to the French in North Africa.
6. The intervention of the Free French Forces in North Africa would only lead to complications, and very likely to a conflict comparable to the Syrian affair.
7. It seems improbable that having been able to keep the Fleet and the North African bases, the French Government should now abandon its protective policy.
8. Although Marshal Pétain is losing his popularity, he is still respected by the majority of the French population who consider that he has done his best to protect them in difficult circumstances.
9. For this reason it seems preferable not to attack Marshal Pétain too violently over the radio, and to concentrate our criticism on Admiral Darlan and his followers.
10. Owing to the growing interest shown by the French population in a Royalist restoration, contacts should be maintained with the Comte de Paris, Pretender to the Throne, in order to harmonise any initiative he may make with the Allied operations.