

5. He expected that the results of this survey would be available towards the end of the week as a basis for assisting USA in determining how best to proceed. In the meantime, Achilles told us that the National Security Council which met last Saturday had not repeat not taken any basic new decisions with respect to Cuba, nor repeat nor did he expect that the NSC at its forthcoming meeting on April 27 would be in a position to take specific action. He indicated, however, that the Administration was itself examining a range of possibilities, including further economic and trade measures (as the *New York Times* suggested yesterday) but said that as yet no repeat no firm decisions had been taken. In this context, we reminded Achilles of the importance of providing us with advance information on any steps which the Administration might propose in this general field which could affect Canadian trade interests and practices (see also our telegram 1324 April 25).†

6. As a further immediate step Achilles said that, based on the President's speech to ASNE, they would continue steadily to develop USA position before world opinion, and he strongly recommended a careful study of this speech. It implied that while Castro's Cuba did not repeat not represent a military threat to USA, it represented a very serious threat to the countries in the area. Achilles also emphasized that the patience of USA with respect to Cuba was not repeat not inexhaustible. He added also that the positive "alliance for progress" concept for Latin America as a whole would be stressed.

7. Finally, Achilles said that State Department was anxious to make the best possible assessment of the actual state of feeling within Cuba. While he refrained from directly criticizing the intelligence basis on which last week's operations had proceeded, he said that they were anxious in considering any policies which might be developed vis-à-vis Cuba, whether collectively or unilaterally, to act on the basis of the clearest possible picture of the situation within Cuba itself. Because of the Canadian mission there, he expressed the hope that we might be in a position to assist State Department in this respect.

8. We asked Achilles what the basis was for the President's discussions with his predecessor and with leaders of the Republican Party. He confirmed that these discussions related to the possibility and advisability of proceeding with further steps on the lines of the approach set out in paragraph 4 above. Achilles added that he personally was not repeat not too optimistic that the OAS governments as a group would be prepared to go along with anti-Castro measures.

9. We enquired about the prospects for the Quito meeting. He said it was "the meeting no repeat no one wanted" and thought it would again be postponed.¹⁰

10. This conversation with Achilles was on a Personal and Confidential basis.

¹⁰

La onzième Conférence interaméricaine. La séance a en fait été reportée; voir le document 829. The Eleventh Inter-American Conference. The meeting was in fact postponed; see document 829.