

balance”, as for example the balance between a small nuclear-weapon state and a nuclear superpower” and “strategic parity”.²⁴

Contemporary analysis emphasizes the gap between the US and China in high tech, and has suggested that the American growth of high-tech arms may well upset international stability, but rather than focusing on inevitable arms race, Chinese policy has pursued selective development of high tech and explored the cheaper and perhaps more rational political alternatives of multipolarity and mulilateralism.²⁵

The Conference, however, scrutinized the doctrine and force structure of China’s Strategic Rocket Forces (or the Second Artillery) as it relates to several different missions including “a credible minimal deterrence vis-à-vis the US”, “a more offensive-oriented posture of ‘limited deterrence’ with regard to China’s theatre nuclear forces”; and “an offensively configured, preemptive, counterforce warfighting posture of active defense”, based on the Second Artillery’s conventional missile forces. This last became the subject of speculation as it connected PLA adaptation to the RMA and the Second Artillery’s development of preemptive theatre missiles and supporting space-based surveillance with the Taiwan question. Apparently the Chinese RMA was threatening Taiwan’s previously assumed viable defence against the mainland; however, given the extraordinarily disproportionate technological advantage that the US has, American concern over Chinese RMA still seems excessive.²⁶

Indeed, the question arises as to whether US policy has effectively dealt with the domestic political exaggeration of the so-called “China threat” and as to whether it is currently responding to a sufficiently well informed understanding of the qualified shifts in Chinese foreign policy and strategic thinking as it relates to new opportunities for arms control cooperation. Both sides have stressed the importance of bilateral trust as necessary to forward movement in arms control, but the forceful US position on

²⁴ See, for example, the Ottawa statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang, Director-General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs at www.wagingpeace.org/articles/01...ang_Chinese-Ambassador_SpeechonABM.html.

²⁵ See Luo Renshi, “The Impact of High-tech Weapons Development over Global Strategic Environment”, *International Strategic Studies*, no. 3, 2000, p. 43; Xie Guang, “Impact of High Tech on International Strategy and Security”, *International Strategic Studies*, no. ,2000, pp. 17-21.

²⁶ For example of how to use speculation to inflate the Chinese technological threat see Mark Stokes, “Weapons of Precise Destruction: PLA Space and Theatre Missile Development”, 106-29, in “China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States”, http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/conference_reports/weapons_mass_destruction.html