

IFOR was given the authority to implement the Dayton Accord's military provisions and to help create secure conditions for civilian-led activities. Within the first mandate, IFOR has functioned effectively thus far; it is the second area which holds both greater potential for impact and greater controversy because of the potential for generating tensions among the major national constituencies and triggering charges, also leveled in Somalia, of "mission creep."<sup>41</sup>

NATO's participation in IFOR has been clearly linked to containing and resolving a European conflict which threatens regional and international security. IFOR's mission has been defined as peace enforcement, not peacekeeping. The military tasks associated with IFOR have been spelled out succinctly: cessation of hostilities, separation of forces, transfer of areas, and curbing of a pattern of violence. Thus far IFOR has assured disengagement and demobilization of the warring armies. A program to equip and train the Bosnian army has begun. Throughout Bosnia, mines are being cleared, schools are being reopened, economic activity is returning, and families are being reunited. Although the pace may not be rapid enough to suit those who have suffered through the war, progress is undeniable.

While IFOR was established to enforce a peace, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was given the mission of supervising a long-ranging normalization and democratization program, including the conduct and supervision of elections, the monitoring of human rights issues, and assistance in regional stabilization. As a result of Annex I-B of the Dayton Accord, negotiations under the OSCE resulted in the Article II CSBM Agreement. On 26 January 1996, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska reached that agreement, a major step toward military stabilization in Bosnia.

Article II of the Bosnian CSBM Agreement, which is of unlimited duration, is based on the 1992 Vienna Document on CSBMs which was updated in 1994. Like the Vienna Document, the CSBM Agreement contains provisions for the exchange of military information, including plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems, the identification and monitoring of weapons manufacturing capabilities, the establishment of military liaison missions, and an ambitious program of military contacts and cooperation. In addition, it contains a number of measures which fall outside the traditional agenda of CSBMs, including, *inter alia*, specific and extensive restrictions on military deployments in certain areas, on the reintroduction of foreign forces, and on the withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons to cantonments. Many analysts have suggested that in this regard, OSCE is venturing into unknown waters.

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full compliance with the Annex which, *inter alia*, calls for cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of foreign forces, and redeployment of forces in timed phases.

<sup>41</sup> "Mission creep" has become the term *du jour* among politicians opposed to their country's participation in U.N. peace operations. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that part of the problem in Somalia was caused by the "mission creep" associated with UNSCR 814.