

Nitze noted that the strategic bomber force was the number planned for deployment even in the absence of a START treaty. As discussed below, this was possible because of the counting rules for ALCMs and gravity bombs used in the US draft treaty.

Similar considerations applied in the case of the US Navy. The week after the Cheney budget announcement of 25 April 1989, Navy spokesmen announced their intention to build twenty-one operational Trident submarines by 1999, a number which would produce a capability to deploy over 4,000 warheads even though the START framework limited total ballistic missile warheads to 4,900. By comparison, seventeen Trident boats — a number which would leave the last one to be authorized in FY 1991 — would be able to deploy 3,244 warheads, or a major fraction of the 4,900 permitted under the START framework. In responding to questions about the need for the additional submarines, spokesmen explained the apparent anomaly by pointing to a significant feature of the START proposal. Where previously it had been assumed that the number of warheads on a missile would be counted as being the maximum number to have been deployed in flight tests, the draft START agreement would not preclude putting fewer warheads on a larger number of platforms. The consequence, however, was that more intrusive inspection would be required to verify that the platform actually carried the number of declared warheads rather than the maximum number of which it was capable.

In the months after the Cheney budget speech of April 1989, little changed in the emerging US force posture. Although there were continuing Congressional pressures to cancel or cut back the B-2 programme, to reduce the number of Trident submarines, and to cancel either or both the MX and the Midgetman, all of these programmes, as well as the advanced cruise missile, survived the FY 1991 budget when it was submitted to Congress in February 1990. In admitting that the decisions on the MX/Midgetman were not a product of the review, Cheney agreed that in a “nice, neat orderly process ... we’d do the strategy and then we’d come around and do the budget.” In this outcome for the Bush Administration, however, neither budgets nor the strategic review produced any significant change in the US plans for strategic force modernization.

The strategic review undertaken by the Bush Administration was meant to set the tone for the recommencement of negotiations in Geneva. However, because no new definition of the US strategic force posture emerged from this review, its first effect was to produce a hiatus in the Geneva negotiations from November 1988 to June 1989. On the other hand, when the talks did finally resume, the US delegation had little new to bring to Geneva, since their START position needed to defend all

of the weapon systems under development, including, paradoxically, the mobile missiles which the United States still officially wished to ban.

MEETING AT JACKSON HOLE

Between June 1989 and the spring of 1990 three further rounds of negotiations took place in Geneva. In addition, two ministerial meetings took place — one at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in September 1989, and one in Moscow in February 1990. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev also met in December 1989 at a mini-summit in Malta. The purpose was to give impetus to, amongst other things, the negotiations in Geneva. All of these meetings were meant to pave the way for a Washington summit in June 1990 at which a strategic arms control treaty would be signed.

When the talks resumed in June 1989, the START framework agreed at the Washington summit of December 1987 was largely intact. In summary, the framework provided for the following:

- a ceiling of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, where ‘strategic’ was defined to include ICBMs and heavy bombers with a range of more than 5,500 kilometres, and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
- no more than 6,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles (thereby restricting for the first time the total number of warheads deployed as opposed to missiles deployed)
- a sublimit of 4,900 on the aggregate number of ICBM and SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total, which allowed each side to choose their preferred combination of ICBM and SLBM warheads
- a sublimit of 154 ‘heavy’ missiles to carry not more than 1,540 warheads, where, for practical purposes, ‘heavy’ was defined as an ICBM equal to or larger than the Soviet SS-18
- a limit on the throw-weight of these missiles such that, after the prescribed reductions, the aggregate throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs would be approximately fifty percent less than current Soviet levels, with the new limit not to be exceeded by either side thereafter.

This framework left a number of outstanding issues to be resolved, perhaps the foremost being the continuing question of the linkage to the ABM Treaty and the deployment of ballistic missile defences. Specifically in relation to offensive force reductions, however, the unresolved problems concerned mobile missiles, further limits on heavy ICBMs, the counting rules for ALCMs, and limits, if any, to be imposed on SLCMs. In addition, complex technical questions of verification remained to be resolved in the expert groups meeting in Geneva.

During the relatively brief eleventh round of negotiations, which began in June and ended early in