

(b) The question of the declaration by States of their stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of such weapons will become more complex because a definition will have to be provided of chemicals intended for commercial purposes which may be produced for binary weapons;

(c) Problems of monitoring the implementation of the convention will acquire a qualitatively new nature if binary weapons are produced;

Control itself, both national and especially international, will in many cases become extremely difficult, if not impossible; conditions may emerge for covert stockpiling and storage of chemicals for binary weapons purposes and for developing chemical weapons under the guise of commercial production.

The United Nations General Assembly, taking into consideration the full danger of the development, commissioning and, especially, proliferation of binary chemical weapons, called upon all States in resolution 36/96 B "to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons ... in those States where there are no such weapons at present".

In the present situation the delegations of the socialist countries consider the implementation of this appeal by the General Assembly to be a matter of prime importance.