particularly in cost terms, to deploy only one system, the pressure from proponents of SDI to initiate early deployments, and the prospect that a treaty-compliant deployment might be more acceptable politically, while not precluding a subsequent break-out from the Treaty, suggest that point defence using 'non-exotic' technologies might be the most realistic option for the Reagan Administration.

In this event, and using non-nuclear warheads, it is not evident that the interception zone itself would create any major issues concerning Canadian territory. However, such a point defence would then focus attention on defence against the air breathing threat. It is possible that the first stages of a new air defence might in turn be a *point* defence of ICBM and ABM bases rather than an area defence, implying that there would not necessarily be any greater pressure to increase capabilities in the far North. But if a point air defence of an ABM site required the interception and destruction of Soviet cruise missiles, possibly by that time with supersonic dash, detection and tracking might be much more likely to involve Canadian air space close to the defended sites.

On the latter point, the debate about the deployment of the Sprint/Spartan system in the 1960s may still be relevant as an indication of the air defence implications of a point defence ABM system. More broadly, the possibility that the United States might deploy an ABM system in this way should act as a caution in formulating Canadian policy on the ABM Treaty. Presumably, there could be no formal objection to a US deployment which was initially within the terms of the ABM Treaty or required only minor renegotiation. At that point, within the framework of the NORAD Agreement there might be considerable pressure to participate with the United States in surveillance systems associated with that deployment.

Second, to continue this consideration within the perspective of the next decade, it is also plausible that the United States might deploy a more extensive but still preferential defence. A preferential defence can take a number of forms: it may involve the defence of military assets widely dispersed, and/or the defence of certain industrial or urban areas. It is preferential because it is not predicated on the assumption that all military and other values can be defended, and it does not, therefore imply a full-scale, leakproof deployment. Achievement of a preferential defence may involve a variety of systems, but it could be confined to the ground-based terminal defence systems which seem likely to yield feasible development programmes before the space-based systems. (A view which is

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[18] (Cont'd)
launchers will be incapable of launching more than one interceptor missile and will not be rapidly reloadable. The ERIS interceptor missile will not be capable of delivering more than one independently-guided warhead." ERIS might usefully be based further north to allow the possibility of multiple intercepts. However, the further north the basing, the more the intercept would involve solving the problems of mid-course tracking and discrimination.