. . . The grounds of said suspicion are that the deponent is told on reliable authority that a package or box was taken into said dwelling-house last night, which there is ground to believe contained intoxicating liquors." Under sec. 136 of the said Act, R.S.C. 1906 ch. 152, a Police Magistrate issued a search-warrant and placed it in the hands of Pellow, who proceeded to search the defendant's house, and found therein a trunk containing four cases of bottled whisky and gin, which he took away. The License Inspector laid an information against the defendant for unlawfully bringing intoxicating liquor into the county of Huron, contrary to the Canada Temperance Act. The defendant appeared before the Police Magistrate; Pellow testified to the facts above stated; and a drayman proved that the trunk had been brought by him for the defendant from a railway station, where it had come as baggage; but no evidence was adduced by the prosecution to shew whence it had come. The defendant, however, testified on his own behalf, and proved that he had brought the liquor from Guelph into the county of Huron; the Police Magistrate convicted, and made an order, under sec. 137 of the Act, for the destruction of the liquor.

It was contended that the search-warrant should be quashed because the "reasonable cause to suspect" was not set out in the information: Rex v. Bender, ante 102; and the learned Judge said that he was bound by that decision to hold that the causes of suspicion must appear in the information. The causes were in fact set out in the information; and, though they might not be sufficient for some magistrates, it could not be said that a magistrate was necessarily wrong in deciding that reasonable cause was disclosed; and his decision should not be interfered with.

It was argued that the name of the person who told Pellow should have been disclosed: Gibbons v. Spalding (1843), 11 M. & W. 173; Gilbert v. Stiles (1889), 13 P.R. 121; Ex p. Grundy (1906), 12 Can. Crim. Cas. 65; Rex v. Lorrimer (1909), 14 Can. Crim. Cas. 430; but, in this case, where the concern was with suspicion only, there was no reason for compelling the informant to disclose the name of *his* informants, unless the magistrate saw fit to do so.

As to the conviction, there was a sufficient note of the adjudication if that is now necessary.

The objection that the informant was given the warrant, that he made the search, and that it was based on evidence so obtained, was without force: Regina v. Heffernan (1887), 13 O.R. 616; Ex p. Dewar (1909), 15 Can. Crim. Cas. 273.