

possibility of truth only seems to be lacking in evidence because it is the source of all evidence.

There are other more specific criticisms to which Mr. James seems to me open, but it will be better to defer these till we have seen how his followers have expanded what in him is only a method into a dogmatic system. Pragmatism is after all little more in Mr. James' hands than a working conception,—one might almost call it a "dodge"—by which, in default of scientific evidence, we contrive to live and to turn Nature to our own ends. We cannot, it is held, refute the sceptic on theoretical grounds, but we can at least get the better of him in practice; for, though we have no way of knowing whether we have even partially apprehended the world, not even the sceptic can show that we have not truly apprehended it, and we have always this advantage over him, that the beliefs on which we act prove or disprove themselves practically in this way, that they either do or do not give satisfaction to our whole nature. Mr. James, however, only brings the pragmatic method into play in cases where we have to make "a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds," excepting from its sway, the whole sphere of scientific judgments. It is seldom, however, the case that the follower exhibits the same self-restraint as the master, and hence we find Mr. Schiller boldly maintaining that no truth, scientific or other, is ever determined on purely intellectual grounds. Nor does he admit that "throughout the breadth of physical nature facts are what they are quite independently of us"; on the contrary, he advances the

startling paradox that in the apprehension of nature we are by no means "recorders, not makers, of the truth" (to use Mr. James' words), but literally construct Nature, or at least transform it into something different from what it is prior to our apprehension of it. This thesis our author defends at length in his article on "Axioms as Postulates." Starting from the fact that the world as we know it is a gradual construction reached by successive trial, he maintains that it takes its whole form from our successive experiments in shaping it. No doubt we cannot give it any form we please; but, though there is in it a resisting factor, what the world *is*, is what we *make* out of it. Thus, in an absolutely literal sense, the universe develops from lower to higher; the development being not simply in our apprehension, but in the world itself. Mr. Bradley speaks somewhere of the idea that the Absolute develops as "blasphemous or worse"; Mr. Schiller has no hesitation in affirming that Reality itself advances from lower to higher; nor does he hesitate to make this affirmation though, as one of its consequences, he is forced to admit that it is incompatible with the infinity of God, which he therefore denies. Let us glance at the line of thought by which this "humanistic" view of the world is sought to be established.

Matthew Arnold, as everybody knows, was the author of the saying that "Conduct is three-fourths of life." But this, Mr. Schiller tells us, is but a "plausible platitude." The real truth is that conduct is the whole of life, and to give a meaning even to Truth itself is impossible except in terms of Conduct. This is the main