

and perceive is only our sensations themselves. It is, for example, clear that by the sense of sight we can see neither the distance, the size, nor the form of objects. All that we see are different shades of color. We correlate these sensations of sight with certain sensations of touch, and suppose the existence of an external object as the cause of these sensations. But this is only an hypothesis. The so-called objects exist only in our notion, and have a being only as they are perceived. There is thus no such thing as an external world; minds alone exist. Thus did Berkely derive from Locke's principle a thoroughgoing subjective Idealism.

Hume went one step further than Berkely, and carried out Locke's Empiricism until he arrived logically at Scepticism. Hume adopted Locke's theory of the origin of ideas, substituting, for the distinction of outer and inner perception, another antithesis with altered terminology, viz., that of the original and the copied. A content of consciousness is either original or the copy of an original—either an impression or an idea. All ideas, therefore are copies of impressions. Accordingly, as Locke attained the conception of substance only by the habit of always seeing certain modes together, so Hume reduced the conception of substance, of causality, and of every necessary relation, to the simultaneity or succession of impressions, with the resultant ideas. Thus substance is a conception resting only on the association of ideas. Having thus denied the conception of substance, Hume denied also the conception of the Ego or self. The Ego, if it really exists, must be a substance possessing inherent qualities. But since our conception of substance is wholly subjective, without objective reality, it follows that there is no reality corresponding to our conception of the Ego. All we know is a succession, a chain of ideas. We assume a substratum, in which these ideas inhere. This substratum we call mind or self. This, again, is but an hypothesis. Thus did Hume base, on Locke's principle, the theory by which he sought to involve the whole superstructure of human knowledge.

A development of another sort, which led to the goal of Materialism in the cases of Hartley and Condillac, was that which took place along the line of physiological psychology. Locke had regarded the elaboration of sensation in the functions underlying reflection as a work of the mind; and, while avoiding the question as to material substance, had treated the intellectual activities as something incorporeal and independent of the body.

That thinkers should begin to consider the physical organism as the bearer or agent, not only of the simple ideas, but also of the formation of those simple ideas into complex, was easily possible in view of Locke's ambiguity. The question began to be considered, whether it was necessary that he same processes, which in the animal seemed capable of being understood as nervous processes, should be traced back, in the case of man, to the activity of an immaterial psychical substance.

In England, the study of the internal mechanism, as a psychical process, was taken up by Hartley. While he held fast to the qualitative difference between psychical functions and nervous excitations, yet, accounting for the phenomena of sensation by certain vibrations in the nervous system, he built thereupon his well-known doctrine of the "Association of Ideas. The objects of the external world affect the extreme ends of the nerves, which extend from the brain to every part of the body. This affection is conveyed along the nerve to the brain, where it constitutes sensation. When a sensation has been experienced several times, the vibratory movement from which it arises acquires the tendency to repeat itself spontaneously, even when the external object is not present. These repetitions of sensations are ideas, which in turn possess the property of recalling each other by virtue of mutual association among themselves. This principle of association affords an explanation of all the phenomena of consciousness. Thus Hartley, founding on Locke's theory of sensation, arrived at Materialism.