

myself is not a collection of sensation or a congeries of thoughts but a something to which both thoughts and sensations belongs. It is a central point to which all the influences that affect me converge and from which all the affluences by which I affect other things diverge. When I use the pronoun "I" it is to mark myself in contradistinction, not only to all that surrounds me, but to all else that appertains to me. Whenever I affirm my consciousness I thereby affirm my existence as a separate personality. Sensation, perception, volition, action, are recognized by me, not as self, but as affections and exertions of self. I am not and cannot be an abstraction, but a substantial existence, and my knowledge of this existence is higher than any I can possibly obtain of my surroundings or of anything which is exterior to me. Then I see around me other personages whom I infer to be like myself, conscious thinking beings. I do not and cannot see their consciousness, but only the manifestation of such consciousness which is fact enough. Prof. Maurice has well said "The student of history finds himself amidst a world of I's." All my knowledge must be tested by my consciousness. The external world can only be proved to exist by appealing to this consciousness. The senses are simply the inlets to this and of themselves have no separate or independent means of deciding anything. Here it is that the materialistic philosophy so thoroughly breaks down, for it elevates matter above that by which alone material existences can be known.

II. IT IS A NECESSARY TRUTH FROM WHICH THERE IS NO ESCAPE THAT SOMETHING IS ETERNAL.

Something must have existed from all Eternity. This truth is axiomatic. It is a necessity of thought and, consequently, needs no proof, and is susceptible of none, because it is a necessity of thought. Something must have existed from all Eternity, or there had still been nought; for *ex nihilo nihil fit*. "This," says Dr. Samuel Clark, "is so evident and undeniable a proposition that no Atheist in any age has ever presumed to assert the contrary; and therefore there is little need of being particular in the proof of it. For, since something now is, 'tis