

ian question and the Syrian-Israeli struggle over Lebanon, the antagonistic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union after Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the UN's failure to provide a framework to "de-link" the Palestinian question from the Israeli-Lebanese aspect of the situation, have all impeded the conduct of UNIFIL's operation. It follows that the effectiveness of the force requires an agreement among the parties directly involved in the conflict on the implementation of the mandate of the UN force, and for such an agreement to be supplemented by a sufficient support from the permanent members of the Security Council.

This does not mean that the presence of the UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon has been useless. Skogmo argues quite convincingly that an evaluation of the UNIFIL's role should be calculated against the circumstances under which the force operates. For unlike the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEFII) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which were established in Sinai (1973) and Golan Heights (1974), respectively, UNIFIL has never enjoyed a high degree of support from the superpowers. Rather, UNIFIL was deployed in a densely populated area that was under the control of local and yet irresponsible barons. But despite these and other difficulties, Skogmo observes, UNIFIL has succeeded in restricting Israel's military activities and in providing humanitarian assistance to the population there.

Should UNIFIL be withdrawn from southern Lebanon or should it continue its difficult mission there? Surprisingly, the author — in spite of his diplomatic service at the Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN — does not support or oppose either argument. Instead, Skogmo goes so far as to see a possible settlement in the Middle East outside the framework of the United Nations and its method of international peacekeeping. The book is a non-polemical account of the tragic developments inside Lebanon and the politics of pulling and pushing which took place in New York and other capitals. Skogmo's book will increase people's awareness of the UN and its peaceful operations. I strongly recommend it for every student of international politics.

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Cold War beneficiary

by Wolfgang Haider

Austria in WWII: an Anglo-American Dilemma by Robert H. Keyserlingk. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988, 305 pages, \$29.95.

The author sets out to "investigate post-Anschluss and wartime Anglo-American intentions regarding Austria." In particular he questions the accepted postwar interpretation of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 that Austria was the first victim of Nazi Germany and therefore deserved to be re-established as a sovereign nation. The author contends that this interpretation emerged as the product of the realpolitik at the beginning of the Cold War in 1946-47. "It helped the Anglo-Americans to establish the legitimacy of their occupation presence in Austria, and to justify their postwar support for an independent Austria to be freed from Soviet control." At the same time this interpretation provided the Austrians with an argument to "distance themselves from Nazi Germany's crimes, and to retrieve their republican roots." The original purpose of the Moscow Declaration was merely wartime military propaganda, and it failed in its purpose to demoralize German troops.

Keyserlingk substantiates his argument through painstaking research in mostly British and US archives. He observes that Anglo-American reactions between 1938 and 1945 fall into two categories: public

propaganda statements and a much more secretive political planning. The former were often purposely dubious and therefore susceptible to a wide range of interpretations, but documents on political planning in particular leave little doubt that despite certain differences between the two allies, neither of them planned for a sovereign Austria after the war. Planning for Austria was included in the general plans for Central and Eastern Europe, where the Treaty of Paris had failed to stabilize the region along the nationalistic principle. Therefore a new form of a Danubian Federation was sought, or perhaps a union between some parts of Southern Germany and Austria. The eventual re-emergence of Austria was a historic accident.

The author documents some curious incidents, if not to say blunders. For example, Roosevelt as an admirer of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire and personal friend of Otto von Habsburg, appointed the latter as head of the recruitment committee for an Austrian battalion, which would have included exiles of the former crown countries! Needless to say the effort backfired.

The book is of a high academic standard, with the arguments well documented and rounded. This very fact, however, makes it a book that only the genuinely interested will read from cover to cover. At the same time, the Introduction, the beginning of Chapter 1, and the Conclusion provide an excellent overview for the general reader.

Austria should be grateful to this Canadian scholar for filling an important void in its history. Frequently, such books are better written by outsiders as well as period under scrutiny. A few years ago this book could have made an important contribution to the discussions surrounding Austria's presidential campaign, both on the domestic level where the issue was swept under the carpet for too long, and to international critics of Austria, who would have been reminded of the coincidental circumstances of Austria's rebirth. The book will provide an important historic background to neutral Austria's next international agenda — its application for membership in the Common Market later this year.

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AUSTRIA IN WWII
AN ANGLO-AMERICAN DILEMMA

KEYSERLINGK