

UN programme of assistance and would use machinery in existence already to do so, apart from the Commonwealth plan, there was no precedent for a bilateral aid programme. Mr. Lumumba, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the Guinean and the Ghanaian Ambassadors intervened in turn to explain that UN assistance was not satisfactory: it could be terminated at the request of the Congo, UN experts would be withdrawn and the Congo would have to start again from scratch. They implied that somehow UN technical assistance was not fully compatible with the independence of the Congo and in circumstances unspecified, was likely to be brought to a sudden end. Mr. Cadieux argued that Canada envisaged UN assistance operations as a long-range one of indefinite duration and kept urging the advantage of this approach which had already been tried and found to be successful. Mr. Lumumba then rather sharply stated that obviously we were not agreed as to the best approach. The Congo wanted bilateral aid in addition to UN assistance: while Canada apparently was prepared to support only the latter.⁹ The necessary conclusions had to be drawn and there was no point in pursuing the discussion. Mr. Cadieux said that Canada was clearly in favour of multilateral help: the question of supplementary bilateral arrangements was one for the Government to decide. He was not excluding it as a possibility but merely pointing out that a request on the part of the Congo for a bilateral aid agreement with Canada involved a special new and somewhat difficult policy decision for the Government. No doubt Mr. Lumumba would raise this matter with the Prime Minister, but Mr. Cadieux felt that the discussion had been useful in elucidating how far present arrangements could be used and on what specific point a new policy decision was not required.

5. Shortly after 12 Mr. Lumumba, accompanied by Mr. Kasango, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, called on the Prime Minister. Messrs. Campbell and Cadieux were present, the latter acting as an interpreter. The first part of the interview was very difficult indeed. Mr. Lumumba was behaving like a hostile witness. The Prime Minister was endeavouring to obtain from him some indication of the scope of his requirements and of priorities. He asked, for instance, how many civil servants there were before independence, and how many were now left. The Congolese Prime Minister was most uncooperative. He said that these were political questions and that he had no mandate to discuss them. When the Prime Minister insisted that he had to have some idea of the magnitude of the problem, Mr. Lumumba kept repeating that he needed specialists, experts of all kinds, and that as Prime Minister of an independent country, he was not really concerned with numbers, scales of pay, etc. These were details to be settled by his Ministers. The temperature was rising and it was clear that no progress was being made in spite of the Prime Minister's repeated appeals to Mr. Lumumba to assist him in understanding his problem.

6. The Prime Minister then suggested that Mr. Balcer, who had greeted Mr. Lumumba at the airport and entertained him on the previous day, should join the conversation. When Mr. Balcer arrived, attempts to draw Mr. Lumumba were pursued for a while without much success, until the Prime Minister asked bluntly whether we or the Congolese Government would be expected to pay for these experts. Mr. Lumumba was quick to reply that his Government would pay all expenses, and would be prepared to be generous. He added that he did not expect another Government to pay for the services of Congolese civil servants. This put the matter in a very clearly different perspective. Mr. Lumumba rather unkindly blamed Canadian Government officials for the misunderstanding. The Prime Minister warned Mr. Lumumba that he would have, as Prime Minister, to learn to accept responsibility for the mistakes and

⁹ Note marginale :/Marginal note:
Ditto. [J.G. Diefenbaker]