

clude the possibility of such statements, it would be necessary to abolish the judicial discretion vested in magistrates, and thereby turn them into so many automatons—an object by no means to be desired. On the other hand, the steady and restraining influence of a well-defined and consistent practice with regard to punishment could, surely, be productive only of good.

Many of our readers are, no doubt, familiar with the so-called "légai pillory" in that interesting and entertaining journal, *Truth*. To those possessed of even an elementary legal training, the bald statement of the offence, coupled with the penalty inflicted, without any of the aggravating or alleviating circumstances, which may have been obvious enough to those who were present at the trial, must tend to destroy the value of such records as proofs of magisterial incompetence, or at least render them unconvincing. At the same time there are, now and then, instances of judicial vagaries which appear to justify even this method of criticism. It would be idle to assert that the general public is entirely satisfied with the manner in which the law is administered in some of the inferior courts. But what can be of greater importance than that there should be, so far as is humanly possible, entire public satisfaction in this matter!

The old idea of vengeance as the primary, if not the only, object of punishment is fast becoming obsolete. We desire, for the most part, not to kill but to cure—to prove to one who steals that honesty really is the best policy—to another who has committed an assault that to keep the King's peace pays better than to break it. In order to effect this, all suspicion either of vindictiveness or partiality should not only be absent in fact, but should as far as possible be proved to be absent by the nature of the sentence. A judge should not only act justly, and without personal bias of any kind, but he should convey the impression that he is so doing to the accused and to all those who are present in court. Otherwise, half the moral effect of his judgment is lost. How can he best convey such impression? The answer is by consistency—not only with his own previous